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NOTE
NOTHING IMPROPER? EXAMINING CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS, CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, PARTISAN
MOTIVATION, AND PRETEXTUAL JUSTIFICATION
IN THE U.S. ATTORNEY REMOVALS
David C. Weiss*
The forced mid-term resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys was an un-
precedented event in American history. Nearly one year after the
administration executed the removals, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee was still reviewing and publicizing emails, memoranda, and
other documents in an effort to understand how the firings were ef-
fectuated. This Note examines many of those documents and
concludes that the removals were likely carried out for partisan
reasons. It then draws on the Constitution, Supreme Court prece-
dent, and separation of powers principles to argue that Congress is
constitutionally empowered to enact removal limitations for inferior
officers such as U.S. Attorneys so long as those limitations do not
impermissibly infringe on the president's Article H authority or re-
sult in congressional aggrandizement. Because of the partisan
nature of the attorneys' removals, this Note argues that Congress
should consider such legislation to limit the president's removal of
U.S. Attorneys. In considering the constitutionality and efficacy of a
potential statute, this Note examines three previous pieces of legis-
lation on which such removal limitations could be modeled before
proposing a fourth, hybrid statute that would emphasize the separa-
tion of powers values of balance and accountability in barring
"partisan" removals of U.S. Attorneys. The Note concludes by
claiming that the framework that the Supreme Court created in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green can supply a useful analog to manage
the fact-intensive probe into whether a removal was impermissibly
"partisan" under the proposed statute or merely a typical, "politi-
cal" removal, which any removal statute must likely allow to meet
constitutional muster
* J.D. candidate, December 2008. Thank you to Marvin Krislov for his feedback and en-
couragement, and Brittany Parling and Samuel Brenner for their invaluable comments. Additional
thanks to Stefan Atkinson, Carrie Bierman, Maria L. Domanskis, Josh Eveleth, Adrienne Fowler,
Joan L. Larsen, Amie Medley, Bradley W. Moore, Gil Seinfeld, and Christina B. Whitman.
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There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should have, as
nearly as possible, a detached and impartial view of all groups in his com-
munity. Law enforcement is not automatic. It isn't blind. One of the
greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his
cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which
he receives complaints. If the Department of Justice were to make even a
pretense of reaching every probable violation of federal law, ten times its
present staff will be inadequate ....
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he can choose
his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that
he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that need
to be prosecuted. With the law books filled with a great assortment of
crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical vio-
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lation of some act on the part of almost anyone.... It is in this realm-in
which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to
embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for
an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is
here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes
that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being
attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or
in the way of the prosecutor himself.
-Justice Scalia, dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson,' quoting
Justice, then Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson's
address to a conference of U.S. Attorneys
INTRODUCTION
A Congressman phones the White House to complain about a U.S.
Attorney ("USA") in his state. He is worried about a public corruption in-
vestigation that may implicate him and damage his and the president's
political party. The president contacts the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and asks the Attorney General ("AG") to "look into" and "expedite" the
situation. The AG convenes a team to plan the prosecutor's ouster. The USA
is removed, and word of the firing leaks. The administration states its ra-
tionale for the firing but amends its story as the explanation withers under
scrutiny. The reaction: cries of improper partisanship, congressional hear-
ings, introduction of legislation, but little substantive action. The USA:
David Marston. The president: Jimmy Carter. The year: 1977.'
Fast forwarding thirty years, December 7, 2006 either marked the
beginning of a major constitutional showdown-a date of infamy in a new
interbranch conflict-or Senator Trent Lott was correct to mock claims that
the Bush Administration had made executive personnel decisions for
political reasons as "horrors of horrors."' Despite the ensuing controversy,
for nearly two months, the media and the public failed even to notice the
events of December 7, in which seven USAs received phone calls requesting
• . 4
their resignations. This inattention ceased when the subsequent
1. 487 U.S. 654, 727-28 (1988).
2. For a discussion of the Marston removal, see generally Selection and Removal of U.S.
Attorneys: Hearing on H.R. 10514 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin.
of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 103-14 (1978) [hereinafter House Marston
Hearings]; Don Holt & Diane Camper, The Marston Affair, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 34.
3. FOX News Sunday with Chris Wallace (FOX News television broadcast Mar. 25, 2007)
(transcript), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,261049,00.html.
4. This Note uses the terms "fired," "dismissed," "removed," and "resigned" without dis-
tinction. The media embraced each term and, while the USAs did resign, there was little objection
from the DOJ to the claim that they were fired. See, e.g., Continuing Investigation into the U.S.
Attorneys Controversy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 26-28 (2007) [hereinafter Judiciary Subcomm. Continuing
Investigation Hearings] (testimony of James Comey, former Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice)
(failing to object to repeated characterizations that the USAs were "fired"). The seven USAs who
received the December 7 phone calls requesting their resignation were David Iglesias, New Mexico;
John McKay, Western Washington; Margaret Chiara, Western Michigan; Daniel Bogden, Nevada;
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developments in this classic Washington cover-up--lead-story media
coverage,5 congressional oversight hearings, and the AG's resignation-
illustrated the tensions between the president's removal power and the
proper roles of USAs and the DOJ. Commentators have described issues of
illegal conduct, 6 tensions between "Main Justice" in Washington and USAs'
offices,7 and implications of executive branch appointment of interim
USAs. s They have not, however, examined whether a purely partisan
removal is inherently unconstitutional, nor whether Congress can and
should limit such a removal-particularly given the likely pretext that the
administration used to justify the firings-by statute, regardless of whether
the removal is vulnerable to an underlying constitutional attack.
In many regards, Senator Lott was justified in highlighting the naivet6 of
those who expressed outrage at the suggestion that the administration fired
USAs for political reasons.9 Defenders of the administration's actions stated
that the president's use of politics should rarely, if ever, be limited in terms
of executive branch personnel decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has en-
dorsed the view that the president can remove political appointees for
political reasons in furtherance of his Article II grant." This power can be
difficult to square with the fact that, in its own mission statement,'2 and as
recognized by the Supreme Court, 3 the DOJ has historically ensured-and
Paul Charlton, Arizona; Kevin Ryan, Northern California; Carol Lam, Southern California. Richard
B. Schmitt, U.S. attorney firings open new doors for the 9, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, at A20. In
addition, H.E. "Bud" Cummins 11, Eastern Arkansas, and Todd Graves, Western Missouri, were
asked to resign earlier in 2006 as part of the same DOJ effort and are included as fired USAs in the
media, congressional hearings, and this Note. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H5556 (2007).
5. See Mark Jurkowitz, The Scent of Scandal Makes Gonzales the Big Story, PEJ NEW
COVERAGE INDEX, Mar. 18-23, 2007, http://www.joumalism.org/node/4733 (noting that the USAs'
firings were the most heavily covered story in print, television, and radio media in late March 2007).
6. See, e.g., John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account,
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265 (2008).
7. See, e.g., James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice's Centrali-
zation Efforts in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Live and Learn: Depoliticizing the Interim Appointments
of U.S. Attorneys, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV 297 (2008).
9. See, e.g., Judiciary Subcomm. Continuing Investigation Hearings, supra note 4, at 7-41
(testimony of James Comey, former Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice); David C. Iglesias, Op-Ed.,
'Cowboy up,'Alberto Gonzales, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at A21; Harry Litman, Op-Ed., Guilty of
politics, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A23.
10. See, e.g., Department of Justice Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 110th Cong. (Apr. 19, 2007) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REv. 601 (2005).
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. II; see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-95 (1988); Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S 602, 626-28 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119
(1926).
12. United States Department of Justice, Mission Statement, http://www.justice.gov/
02organizations (last visited Aug. 22, 2008).
13. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the rep-
resentative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all... .").
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is supposed to provide-some modicum of independence in its enforcement
of the law.1
4
Even adhering to a broad reading of the president's removal power,
Congress can assert itself, insisting that removals are executed openly and
that the justifications provided are not pretextual. As Justice Scalia ex-
plained in Morrison v. Olson, a critical limit on the removal power is the
political check." If a unitary executivist relies on the political check to as-
suage concerns of those who may be reluctant to accept an expansive
removal power, 6 it may be cause for concern when an administration takes
purposeful steps to undermine that check.
This Note argues that Congress possesses the constitutional authority to
restrain the president's removal of USAs within limits established by sepa-
ration of powers principles and the Supreme Court's removal power
jurisprudence. It maintains that because of the partisan, pretextual removals
of the USAs, Congress can and should exercise its authority by passing leg-
islation that requires a report of the grounds for removal and provides a
removed USA with a cause of action to challenge her removal. Part I dem-
onstrates why Congress should consider legislation in the wake of the USA
firings by describing the controversy surrounding the USAs' removal and
arguing that the proffered reason for their firing was pretext for removals
motivated by partisanship. Part II asserts that USAs are constitutionally de-
lineated inferior officers and traces the history and current state of removal
power jurisprudence, concluding that removal limitations that do not in-
fringe the president's Article II authority can be constitutional. It claims that
the fired USAs do not possess a cause of action to challenge their removals,
but that Congress is constitutionally empowered to create limits for future
removals-as well as a cause of action for a USA to challenge her re-
moval-so long as such constraints do not undermine the president's Article
II grant. Part III asserts that, because of the administration's efforts to sub-
vert the political check on the removal power by executing the partisan
removals pretextually, Congress would be historically consistent and norma-
tively justified in creating a statutory cause of action for a USA to challenge
her removal. It addresses three previous legislative frameworks that
Congress has considered in its efforts to insulate the DOJ from executive
branch partisanship and concludes that a hybrid statute best incorporates
separation of powers values and Supreme Court precedent. Part III con-
cludes by differentiating between "partisan" and "political" removals. It
argues that federal employment law and a preexisting Supreme Court
14. See id.; Eisenstein, supra note 7, at 221-26; Christian M. Halliburton, The Constitutional
and Statutory Framework Organizing the Office of the United States Attorney, 31 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 213 (2008); Levenson, supra note 8, at 303-05. In addition to the statements of the DOJ and
the Court, there are also normative reasons why one may desire such independence. See Note, Gov-
ernment Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARV L. REV. 1409, 1411, 1415-16 (2008) (arguing
that, in their counseling context, government attorneys owe a primary duty to the president except in
cases of conflict, when the duty to the public takes precedence).
15. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. See id.
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framework' 7 supply a useful analog to manage the fact-intensive probe into
partisanship that a court hearing a removal challenge under the proposed
statute would face.
I. THE U.S. ATTORNEY REMOVAL CONTROVERSY
In the spring of 2007, dissecting the USA firings became a favorite par-
lor game among journalists, legal commentators, bloggers, and armchair
political observers." The story revealed by the thousands of emails that the
DOJ has released more closely resembles a series of snapshots than a coher-
ent narrative. Yet understanding the partisan focus of the removals and the
pretextual spin that emerged when the firings garnered public attention is
essential. First, this factual background is necessary to unpack the difference
between "political" and "partisan" dismissals. As detailed in Part III, a "par-
tisan" removal is one that is potentially improper because it is solely for
political party or electoral advantage, but a "political" removal is one that
can implicate policy such that it is constitutionally proper if it plausibly
comports with the president's Article II grant.' 9 Second, a factual explanation
of the pretext at issue is necessary to understand not only why Congress can
act in this situation, but also why it should.2° Section L.A reconstructs the
USAs' removals, describing the partisan nature of the dismissals. Section I.B
discusses the congressional oversight hearings on the nature of the removals.
Section I.C examines the DOJ's explanations and concludes that the prof-
fered reasons for the firings were pretextual.
A. A History of the U.S. Attorney Firings
Despite the difficulties in constructing a factual account from the byzan-
tine emails, statements, and explanations, it appears that the DOJ's initial
claim-that the USAs were fired for "performance-related reasons"-was a
pretext for dismissals motivated by partisanship. While the nine dismissed
USAs were each appointed by President Bush in either 2001 or 2002,2 the
17. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Aaron Rutkoff, Inside the U.S. Attorneys Emails: Major Players and Themes,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July 11, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
info-retro DOJemails_070319.html; Talking Points Memo, U.S. Attorney Purge Timeline, http://
www.talkingpointsmemo.com/usa-timeline.php (last visited Aug. 22, 2008).
19. See discussion infra Section III.C. 1.
20. See discussion infra Section III.A.
21. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
Harriet Miers, White House Counsel (Mar. 2, 2005, 21:49 EST), available at http:l
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPtl070313.pdf, at OAGOOOOOOO05-1 1; see also supra
note 4 (explaining that nine USAs were actually fired). Part I does not include a detailed account of
the reasons behind each of the USA firings because the justifications for some of the removals are still
unclear. See Memorandum from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to
Members of the Comm. on the Judiciary (July 24, 2007), at 20-30 [hereinafter Conyers Memo], avail-
able at http://media.washingtonpost.conmwp-srv/politics/documents/contempt-memo _072407.pdf.
This lack of information strengthens the argument that Congress should create a cause of action
through which a USA could challenge her removal and bring transparency to the removal process.
[Vol. 107:317
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initial effort to remove USAs began in the White House Counsel's office
after the 2004 election.22 The idea floated at that time was to remove all
ninety-three USAs.23 The DOJ advised against this plan. In replying to the
White House, Kyle Sampson, AG Gonzales's chief of staff, instead recom-
mended replacing "15-20 percent" of the USAs, stating that the other "80-
85 percent ... are doing a great job, are loyal Bushies, etc.... 24 The email
from Sampson noted that he had discussed the issue with Gonzales and
stated that "if Karl [Rove] thinks there would be political will to [proceed
with the firings], then so do 1.,, 25
Throughout 2005, the White House Counsel's office and the DOJ con-
tinued to work on their USA replacement plan. Following Harriet Miers's
inquiry regarding the possibility of replacing all ninety-three USAs, 6
Sampson emailed Miers, the White House Counsel, a chart ranking all
USAs on a variety of criteria including "loyalty to the President."27 David
Iglesias, the USA for New Mexico, appeared on this list as "recommended
• • ,,28
retaining, which was consistent with Sampson's previous view of Iglesias
as a "diverse up-and-comer; solid.''z9 However, during this time, the New
Mexico Republican Party Chairman complained about Iglesias to Rove.3°
While planning for the USAs' removal was ongoing, the DOJ requested
that the Senate Judiciary Committee insert language into the 2005 Patriot Act
reauthorization giving the AG alone, without Senate advice and consent, the
power to appoint interim USAs.3' This change in the Patriot Act emboldened
See discussion infra Section III.B.4 (evaluating the "informational" benefit of the legislation that
this Note proposes).
22. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
William Mercer, Acting Assoc. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 5, 2006, 20:51 EST), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt2O7O3l3.pdf, at OAG000000056.
23. See id.
24. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
David G. Leitch, Deputy White House Counsel (Jan. 9, 2005, 19:34 EST), available at http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documentslWSJ-5DOJ20070313-pl.pdf. The subject line of the
email was "RE: Questions from Karl Rove [Deputy Chief of Staff]." Id.
25. Id.
26. Dan Eggen & John Solomon, Firings Had Genesis in White House, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 2007, at Al.
27. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
Harriet Miers, White House Counsel (Mar. 2, 2005, 17:42 EST), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPtO70313.pdf, at OAGO0000003.
28. Id. (explaining chart); email from Kyle Sampson to Harriet Miers (Mar. 2, 2005, 21:49
EST), supra note 21 (containing chart).
29. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to Susan
Richmond, Assistant to the Att'y Gen. & Deputy White House Liaison (Apr. 29, 2004, 12:11 EST),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt7-1070319.pdf, at OAG000000155.
30. Margaret Talev & Marisa Taylor, Rove was asked to fire U.S. attorney, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/margaret-talev/story/
16356.html.
31. U.S.A. Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 502, 120 Stat. 191, 246 (2006) (amended 2007). 28 U.S.C. § 546 was subsequently returned to its
pre-2006 form. Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-34, § 2,
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the White House and the DOJ to dismiss the USAs." Shortly after the reau-
thorization Sampson emailed Miers suggesting that instead of firing all
USAs they could remove seven of them based on evaluations that Sampson
conducted within the DOJ.33
In April 2006 the partisan pressure on the USAs increased. Senator Pete
Domenici called the Office of the AG to complain about Iglesias's perform-
ance,34 and on the same day that the L.A. Times reported that USA Carol
Lam's inquiry had extended to reach Congressman Jerry Lewis, 35 Sampson
emailed the White House mentioning that "[t]he real problem we have right
now with Carol Lam that leads me to conclude that we should have some-
one ready to be nominated., 36 Lam was coming under increased scrutiny
from Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham, who had signed a letter to
the AG criticizing her,37 and whom she was investigating.38 While Lam con-
tinued to absorb criticism, the DOJ sent a letter in August to Senator Diane
Feinstein replying to an inquiry she had made as to immigration enforce-
ment.39 In the letter, the DOJ defended Lam's immigration enforcement
strategy.,0
In addition to Lam, Iglesias continued to face partisan complaints in the
summer of 2006. In June, Scott Jennings, who reported directly to Rove,
emailed Monica Goodling, Director of Public Affairs at the DOJ, regarding
121 Stat. 224, 224 (2007); see also Levenson, supra note 8, at 320; Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen,
Prosecutor Posts Go to Bush Insiders; Less Preference Shown for Locals, Senators' Choices, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at A1.
32. See email from Monica Goodling, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to Kyle
Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen. (Sept. 13, 2006, 16:17 EST), avail-
able at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt40703I3.pdf, at OAG000000121-22. As
Sampson noted in an email, the new powers would allow the DOJ to get "our preferred person ap-
pointed" with "far less deference to home-State Senators," id.; however, after the controversy
became a major media story, William Moschella, Principal Associate Deputy AG, claimed that he
alone was responsible for requesting that the change be made to the Patriot Act, Margaret Talev &
Marisa Taylor, Justice Dept. distances White House from firings of U.S. attorneys, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/marisa-taylor/story/
15779.html.
33. Email from Kyle Sampson to Harriet Miers (Mar. 2, 2005, 21:49 EST), supra note 21.
Sampson's list of potential removals included Chiara, Cummins, and Lam, but not Iglesias, Ryan, or
Charlton. Id.
34. Dan Eggen, Domenici Says He Contacted Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2007, at Al.
35. Peter Pae, Lewis Surfaces in Probe of Cunningham, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at Al.
36. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
William Kelley, Deputy White House Counsel (May. 11, 2006, 11:36 EST), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt3O7O313.pdf, at OAG000000022.
37. See letter from nineteen members of Congress to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. (Oct. 20,
2005), available at http://online.wsj.comlpublic/resources/documents[WSJDOJDocsPtl -
070319p25-26.pdf.
38. See David Johnston, Ex-C.IA. Official Indicted In Inquiry Into Contracts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2007, at A24. Due to Lam's investigation, Cunningham eventually plead guilty to accepting
gifts valued at more than $2 million. Id.
39. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Sen. Diane Feinstein (Aug.
23, 2006), available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/doj-lami?resultpage= I&.
40. See id.
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a donor who was "heavily involved in the President's campaign's legal
team" and wanted to meet with someone at the DOJ regarding Iglesias.4'
Goodling suggested that the donor meet with her if the matter was "sensi-
tive," as opposed to a "more generic resources type of conversation"42;•• ,,41
Jennings replied that it was indeed "sensitive.
While Iglesias was facing this pressure, the sword had already fallen on
USA Bud Cummins, who was asked to resign in June so that someone else
could serve as the USA for the Eastern District of Arkansas." Cummins's
replacement was Timothy Griffin, a former aide to Karl Rove and the first
USA appointed under the new Patriot Act procedures.45 Commentators as-
sumed that his nomination would have been difficult to confirm in the
Senate due to the appearance that the placement was a reward for his service
under Karl Rove in the White House, and allegations that Griffin was in-
46
strumental in a plan to disenfranchise minority voters in the 2004 election.
USAs John McKay and Paul Charlton also defended themselves from
partisan attacks in the summer of 2006. McKay, of Washington, responded
to criticisms of his conduct following Washington's 2004 gubernatorial elec-
tion, which was narrowly won by the Democratic candidate. 7 McKay later
explained in his congressional testimony that following the 2004 election
Congressman Doc Hastings's chief of staff contacted him and inquired
whether McKay would be pursuing charges of voter fraud . Charlton, of
Arizona, was also conducting public corruption investigations involving
members of Congress. Six weeks before Charlton was fired, Congressman
Rick Renzi's chief of staff placed a call to Charlton questioning his federal
41. Email from Scott Jennings, Special Assistant to the President & Deputy Political
Advisor, to Monica Goodling, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice (June 20, 2006, 10:16 EST),
available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/ennings-nm.
42. Email from Monica Goodling, Dir. of Public Affairs, Dep't of Justice, to Scott Jennings,
Special Assistant to the President & Deputy Political Advisor, (June 20, 2006, 11:30 EST), available
at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/jennings-nm.
43. Email from Scott Jennings, Special Assistant to the President & Deputy Political
Advisor, to Monica Goodling, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice (June 20, 2006, 11:42 EST),
available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/jennings-nm.
44. Donna Leinwand & Kevin Johnson, Gonzales' deputy attorney to step down: Has testi-
fied 7 of 8 prosecutors fired for performance, USA TODAY, May 15, 2007, at 5A.
45. Warwick Sabin, End Around: Senators question U.S. attorney appointment, ARK. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2006.
46. Id.
47. A 261-vote margin separated the Democrat and Republican candidates. See Wash. Sec'y
of State, 2004 Governor's Race, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/2004gov-race.aspx (last
visited Aug. 22, 2008).
48. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Prosecutors Say They Felt Pressured, Threatened, WASH. POST,
Mar. 7, 2007, at Al. In addition to this contact, the Chairman of Washington's Republican Party,
while in "regular" contact with Karl Rove regarding the election, contacted McKay regarding the
investigation into voter fraud in the gubernatorial race that he hoped McKay would pursue more
aggressively. David Bowermaster, GOP Chair called McKay about '04 election, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2007, at Ai. Washington businessman and Republican contributor Tom McCabe also made
"repeated" calls to the White House asking that McKay be fired for failing to adequately investigate
the alleged voter fraud. David Bowermaster, McKay "stunned" by report on Bush, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2007, at A9.
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probe of Renzi's role in a land deal that benefited his friend and former
business partner.49 Charlton later told House investigators that he alerted the
DOJ about the call because he believed it was potentially improper."'
In September, the DOJ and the White House continued planning the re-
movals,5' increasing the partisan pressure on the USAs. McKay stated that in
September, during an interview for a federal judgeship, White House offi-
cials asked him to explain why he had "mishandled" the governor's race."
Iglesias recounted that one month before the 2006 election he received calls
from Republican members of New Mexico's congressional delegation seek-
ing information and making veiled threats about his voter-fraud
investigation." It was during this period that President Bush spoke with the
AG, alerting him to complaints that some USAs had failed to pursue voter-
fraud cases.54 Iglesias was then added to the dismissal list just before the
November 7 elections, after Rove complained to the DOJ regarding
Iglesias's investigation.5
On November 27, 2006, Sampson organized a high-level DOJ meeting,
56which Gonzales attended, to discuss the removals. Also in November, an
49. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Renzi Aide Called U.S. Attorney to Ask About Probe,
WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A4.
50. Id.
51. In September, the list of USAs to be fired included all of the eventually fired attomeys
except Iglesias and Ryan; Sampson urged that, "as a matter of Administration policy, we utilize the
new statutory provisions that authorize the AG to make USA appointments." Email from Kyle
Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to Harriet Miers, White House
Counsel (Sep. 13, 2006, 16:25 EST), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DOJDocsPt2070313.pdf, at 0AG000000032.
52. Eggen & Kane, supra note 48. In addition, William Kelley asked McKay to explain
"'why Republicans in the state of Washington would be angry with [him].'" R. Jeffrey Smith, Ex-
Prosecutor Says He Faced Partisan Questions Before Firing, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2007, at A3.
53. Iglesias testified that Congresswoman Heather Wilson and Senator Domenici contacted
him to inquire about his voter-fraud and corruption probe of Democrats in New Mexico relating to
possible kickbacks. Eggen, supra note 34. Wilson was in the middle of a reelection campaign that
she would win by just 861 votes. See New Mexico Sec'y of State, Canvass of Retums of General
Election Held on November 7, 2006, http://www.sos.state.nm.us/06GenResults/Statewide.pdf, at 1.
Iglesias stated that he felt "leaned on" and "sickened" by the calls, stating that Wilson asked him,
"'[w]hat can you tell me about sealed indictments'" and that when he was unresponsive, Wilson
became upset and ended the phone call. Eggen & Kane, supra note 48. Approximately ten days after
the call from Wilson, Iglesias stated that he received a call at his home from Domenici who asked
him if the kickback charges were "going to be filed before November." Id. However, Domenici
claimed that "'at no time in that conversation or any other conversation with Mr. Iglesias did I ever
tell him what course of action I thought he should take on any legal matter. I have never pressured
him nor threatened him in any way.'" Eggen, supra note 34. Wilson similarly claimed that she "'did
not ask about the timing of any indictments and [she] did not tell Mr. Iglesias what course of action
[she] thought he should take or pressure him in any way.'" Paul Kane & Dan Eggen, Second
Lawmaker Contacted Prosecutor, WASH. POST., Mar. 6, 2007, at A 1.
54. Eggen & Solomon, supra note 26.
55. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Ex-Aide Contradicts Gonzales on Firings, WASH. POST, Mar.
30, 2007, at Al.
56. See CQ Transcripts Wire, Transcript: Gonzales Testifies Before Senate Panel,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
04/19/AR2007041902035_pf.html; Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, to Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., Dep't Justice (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://
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email exchange between Tasia Scolinos, Director of Public Affairs, DOJ,
and Catherine Martin, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy
Communications Director for Policy and Planning, White House Counsel's
Office, illustrated a media strategy of ex post justification for the firings by
drawing the immigration thread between Charlton, Lam, and Iglesias.57
Finally, on December 7, 2006, Mike Battle, Director of the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys, phoned the USAs to ask for their resignations;
none were given a reason for the dismissal.5 s The dismissals were conducted
privately so there was no immediate public backlash; however, by January
Senators Patrick Leahy and Feinstein had noticed the firings, and on January
11, 2007, Feinstein issued a press release that generated national news about
the firings for the first time.5 9
B. Congressional Oversight of the Removals
Following the publicity surrounding the USA removals, Congress at-
tempted to uncover the reasons for the removals with a particular focus on
whether the removals were pretextual and whether the administration had
actually orchestrated them for partisan reasons. At the outset of the congres-
sional investigation into the USA firings, the DOJ was adamant that it had
been transparent and proper. On January 18, 2007, Gonzales testified that he
would "'never, ever make a change in a United States attorney for political
reasons or if it would in any way jeopardize an ongoing serious investiga-
tion. I just would not do it.' "60
leahy.senate.gov/press/200708/8-16-07%20PJL%201tr%2Oto%20Glenn%20Fine-AG.pdf; email from
Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to Andrew Beach (Nov. 21,
2006, 18:49 EST), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OAG878-914.pdf, at
OAG000000878 (inviting Gonzales to attend the meeting).
57. In discussing possible political fallout from the firings and the communications strat-
egy to deal with it, Scolinos wrote Martin: "The one common link here is that three of them are
along the southern border so you could make the connection that DOJ is unhappy with the immi-
gration prosecution numbers in those districts." Email from Tasia Scolinos, Dir. of Public Affairs,
Dep't of Justice, to Catherine Martin, Deputy Assistant to the President & Deputy Commc'ns
Dir. for Policy and Planning, White House Counsel's Office (Nov. 21, 2006, 13:20 EST), avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-onecommonlink-email-p5-6.pdf,
at OPA000000005.
58. Eggen & Solomon, supra note 26. According to Iglesias, when he asked Battle why he
was being asked to resign, Battle responded, "'I don't know and I don't want to know.'" Questions
from Subcommittee Chair Linda Sdnchez for David Iglesias, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, http://
judiciary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Chair-glesiasO7O430.pdf. According to Bogden, after he was told
to resign, he contacted Associate AG Mercer to find out why he was being fired, and that Mercer
told him that the administration had a short, two-year window in which to provide more Republi-
cans with the opportunity to have been USAs so that more Republicans would make strong
candidates for the Federal bench and future political positions. Questions from Subcommittee Chair
Linda Sanchez for Daniel Bogden, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, http://judiciary.house.govl
Media/PDFS/sanchezQnA070430.pdf.
59. Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Senators Feinstein, Leahy, Pryor to
Fight Administration's Effort to Circumvent Senate Confirmation Process for U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 11,
2007), available at http:llfeinstein.senate.gov/publicrtndex.cfm?FuseAcion=NewsRoom.PressReleases&
ContentRecordid=l 8a696d7-7e9c-9a19-7a2b-397a786a69fc&Region id=&Issueid=.
60. Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Firings Not Political, Gonzales Says, WASH. Posi, Jan. 19, 2007,
at A2.
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One month after the AG's claims, Deputy AG Paul McNulty testified
that the USAs were removed because of "performance-related" issues.6'
This testimony was likely a critical turning point in the USA firing contro-
versy. Until the "performance-related" justification, not one of the fired
USAs had spoken out in her own defense. At least one USA reported to the
Washington Post that the performance-related justification spurred the fired
attorneys into action, and "'was the moment the gloves came off.' ,62 In the
weeks following McNulty's testimony, USAs McKay and Daniel Bogden
(of Nevada) defended their offices, stating that neither had received reviews
indicating performance-related problems. 6' By March Mike Battle an-
nounced his resignation,6 amid reports that six of the dismissed USAs had
received positive job evaluations.
On March 6 the USAs testified on Capitol Hill, claiming pretextual justi-
fications for the firings. Iglesias and McKay testified to the pressuring calls
that they had received from members of Congress and staff.66 Bogden and
Charlton testified that William Mercer, Acting Associate AG, told them that
61they were removed to allow other Republicans to build their resume.
Cummins testified that Michael Elston, Chief of Staff and Counselor, Office
of the Deputy AG, called him before the hearing to discuss the implications
of further public comments by the fired USAs. 6s Following that call, Cum-
mins sent an email to the other USAs, alerting them that what Elston had
61. Marisa Taylor, Official denies prosecutors were ousted for political reasons,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.con/staff/marisa-
taylor/story/I 5563.html. McNulty testified that the DOJ "'never [has] and never will seek to remove
a United States attorney to interfere with an ongoing investigation or prosecution, or in retaliation
for prosecution,'" but he conceded that Cummins was not removed for a performance-related rea-
son. Id.; see also Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is The Department of Justice Politicizing
the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (Feb. 6, 2007) (testimony of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice).
62. Dan Eggen, 6 of 7 Dismissed U.S. Attorneys Had Positive Job Evaluations, WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 2007, at All. But see McKay, supra note 6, at 270-71 (claiming that the USAs were
spurred into action after Gonzales's January 18 testimony during which they believed he was "ly-
ing" to the Senate Judiciary Committee).
63. Dan Eggen, Fired Prosecutor Disputes Justice Dept. Allegation, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,
2007, at A6; Adrienne Packer, U.S. attorney rebuts claim performance led to firing, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Feb. 8, 2007, at 1B.
64. Laurie Kellman, Probe of Prosecutor Firings Intensifies, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/05/AR2007030500170.html.
65. See Eggen, supra note 62.
66. Restoring Checks and Balances in the Confirmation Process of United States Attorneys:
Hearing on H.R. 580 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 49-50, 54 (2007) [hereinafter House Confirmation Process Hearings] (tes-
timony of David C. Iglesias, former U.S. Att'y for the D.N.M., and John McKay, former U.S. Att'y
for the W.D. Mich.).
67. Id. at 73, 76 (testimony of Daniel Bogden, former U.S. Att'y for the D. Nev., and Paul K.
Charlton, former U.S. Att'y for the D. Ariz.).
68. Id. at 78-79 (testimony of H.E. (Bud) Cummins, former U.S. Att'y for the E.D. Ark.).
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told him could be interpreted as a threat.69 At the same hearing, Principal
Associate Deputy AG William Moschella testified that the dismissals were
motivated by a number of factors, including a desire for "renewed vigor,"
insubordination, failure to follow DOJ policy, and "a need for greater lead-
ership."70
The day after the USAs' testimony, Gonzales wrote in USA Today that
the scandal was merely an "overblown personnel matter" and that the fired
USAs had simply lost Gonzales's confidence. 7' However, by March 13 Kyle
Sampson had resigned as Gonzales's chief of staff. 2 In conjunction with the
resignation, the DOJ claimed that Sampson failed to share information regard-
ing his work on the USAs' removal within the DOJ.73 The next day Gonzales
claimed that he was only peripherally aware of the firing process, which
Sampson had directed.74  But despite Gonzales's claims, on March 16,
Sampson asserted that he had not misled anyone at the DOJ and that "'[t]he
fact that the White House and Justice Department had been discussing this
subject since the election was well known to a number of other senior officials
69. Email from HE. "Bud" Cummins to Dan Bogden, Paul K. Charlton, David Iglesias,
Carol Lam, John McKay (Feb. 20, 2007, 17:06 EST), available at http://www.
talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/usa-email. Cummins wrote in the email:
The essence of [Elston's] message was that [the people at DOJ] feel like they are taking un-
necessary flak to avoid trashing each of us specifically or further, but if they feel like any of us
intend to continue to offer quotes to the press, or organize behind the scenes congressional
pressure, then they would feel forced to somehow pull their gloves off and offer public criti-
cisms .... [Elston] reacted quite a bit to the idea of anyone voluntarily testifying and it
seemed clear that they would see that as a major escalation of the conflict meriting some kind
of unspecified form of retaliation.
Id.
70. House Confirmation Process Hearings, supra note 66, at 19-20 (testimony of William
Moschella, Principal Associate Deputy Att'y Gen.).
71. Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed., They lost my confidence, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2007, at
I0A.
72. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Zeleny, 'Mistakes' Made on Prosecutors, Gonzales Admits,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at Al.
73. Id.
74. Transcript, Attomey General Gonzales On the U.S. Attomey Firings (Mar. 13, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/1 3//AR200703 130089 .html.
Gonzales stated:
[Slo, as far as I knew, my chief of staff was involved in the process of determining who were
the weak performers; where were the districts around the country where we could do better for
the people in that district.
But that is, in essence, what I knew about the process. I was not involved in seeing any
memos, was not involved in any discussions about what was going on....
I never saw documents. We never had a discussion about where things stood.
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at the department, including others who were involved in preparing the de-
partment's testimony to Congress.' ,7
Following Sampson's statement, the White House and the DOJ faced
continued pressure as details of the November 27, 2006 meeting attended by
Gonzales became public, appearing to contradict the AG's previous state-
ments.76 On March 28, Acting Assistant AG Richard Herling sent a letter to
Representatives John Conyers and Linda Sanchez stating that previous
•77
statements supplied to Congress were inaccurate. Namely, despite
Sampson writing on December 19 that the appointment of Griffin was "im-
portant to Harriet [Miers], Karl [Rove], etc. 78 Sampson and Hertling signed
off on a February 23, 2007 letter to Senator Charles Schumer stating that
"[t]he Department is not aware of Karl Rove playing any role in the decision
to appoint Mr. Griffin. 79
On March 29, 2007, Sampson testified that he had at least five discussions
with Gonzales regarding the removals and that Gonzales's testimony to the
contrary was not "accurate."80 Sampson also testified that "'the decision mak-
ers in this case were the attorney general and the counsel to the president
[Miers].' " Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April
19, 2007, in what was largely perceived as a hearing on which his job
75. Former Justice Dept. Official Defends Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at A23 (quot-
ing Brad Berenson, Kyle Sampson's lawyer).
76. See Dan Eggen, Gonzales Met With Top Aides On Firings, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2007, at
AI; David Stout & David Johnston, A Top Aide to Gonzales Resigns, Becoming Latest Fallout
Casualty, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at Al. Goodling took a leave of absence from her position and
resigned on April 6. Stout & Johnston, supra.
77. Letter from Richard A. Herding, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., to Rep. John Conyers, Jr.
and Rep. Linda T. Sanchez (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Conyers-Sanchez07O328.pdf.
78. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
Monica Goodling, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, United States Department of Justice (Dec. 19, 2006,
18:27 EST), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt30703l3.pdf, at
OAGOOOOOO127.
79. Compare Letter from Richard A. Herling, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., to Sen. Charles
E. Schumer (Feb. 23, 2007), available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/schumer-
letter/?resultpage= I& (indicating that the letter was from Hertling), with email from Kyle Sampson,
Chief of Staff, Dep't of Justice, to Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, et al., at
DAG00000228-29 (Feb. 8, 2007, 16:15 EST), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DAG2228-2293.pdf (providing the draft text of the letter that Hertling eventually signed).
80. Eggen & Kane, supra note 55. Recalling that Gonzales "'had received a complaint from
Karl Rove about U.S. attorneys in three jurisdictions,'" Dana Milbank, Taking One for the Team,
When He Could Remember, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at A2, Sampson stated, "'I don't think the
attorney general's statement that he was not involved in any discussions of U.S. attorney removals
was accurate . .. . I remember discussing with him this process of asking certain U.S. attorneys to
resign.'" Eggen & Kane, supra note 55.
81. Eggen & Kane, supra note 55. Sampson, however, stressed that, to his knowledge, nei-
ther he nor any other DOJ official did anything improper in the USA removals. Id. Sampson
explained the apparent contradiction between the letter to Schumer, which claimed that Rove played
no role in the appointment of Griffin, and his statement in his email, claiming that the appointment
of Griffin was important to Miers and Rove, by explaining that he had actually discussed the ap-
pointment only with Rove's aides and thus assumed the importance to Rove. See David Johnston &
Eric Lipton, Ex-Aide Disputes Gonzales Stand Over Dismissals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, at Al.
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depended."2 Prior to the hearing, Gonzales published an op-ed in the
Washington Post in which he wrote that none of the removals was pursued
for an "improper reason."83
In his testimony Gonzales again claimed that nothing improper had oc-
cuffed: "'It would be improper to remove a U.S. Attorney to interfere with
or influence a particular prosecution for partisan political gain. I did not do
that. I would never do that.' ,8 Gonzales did not remember many details the
committee desired, including the discussions leading up to the USAs' firing
and the November 27 meeting that he attended8 5 Though he claimed that the
USAs were not removed for improper reasons, Gonzales did confirm
Sampson's testimony that Rove had discussed frustration with Iglesias and
86
other USAs regarding voter-fraud investigations.
Although Gonzales survived the April hearing, trouble lay ahead for the
embattled AG. The removal revelations continued in Spring 2007 with the
USAs' direct supervisor's testimony that the reasons supplied by the DOJ
for the dismissals had "not been consistent with [his] experience; 87 the res-
ignation of Paul McNulty, Deputy AG;8 an increased focus on USA
resignations and the connection to voter-fraud cases in battleground election
states; 9 more calls from members of Congress, including Republicans, for
82. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Senate Delays Gonzales Testimony on Firings, WASH. POST,
Apr. 17, 2007, at Al4.
83. Gonzales wrote:
I know that I did not-and would not-ask for the resignation of any U.S. attorney for an im-
proper reason....
... To be clear: I directed my then-deputy chief of staff, Kyle Sampson, to initiate this process;
fully knew that it was occurring; and approved the final recommendations. Sampson periodi-
cally updated me on the review. As I recall, his updates were brief, relatively few in number
and focused primarily on the review process.
During those conversations, to my knowledge, I did not make decisions about who should or
should not be asked to resign.
Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed., Nothing Improper, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, at B7.
84. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Senators Chastise Gonzales at Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
2007, atAl.
85. Id.
86. Id. In addition, the DOJ began an internal review as to whether Monica Goodling vio-
lated the Hatch Act in considering political affiliation in the appointment of interim or acting USAs.
Dan Eggen and Amy Goldstein, Ex-Aide to Gonzales Accused Of Bias, WASH. POST, May 3, 2007,
at Al.
87. Judiciary Subcomm. Continuing Investigation Hearings, supra note 4, at 10 (testimony
of James Comey, former Deputy Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice).
88. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. (May
14, 2007), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documentsMcNulty_
Resignation_051407.pdf.
89. Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Voter-Fraud Complaints by GOP Drove Dismissals,
WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4. These cases included USAs Todd Graves and Steven Biskupic,
of Milwaukee, who was initially targeted to be removed but was saved, perhaps because he brought
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Gonzales's resignation;9 and, finally, the use-immunity testimony of
Monica Goodling. In her testimony on May 23, Goodling minimized her
role in the firings. She continued to create problems for Gonzales, however,
describing a conversation she had with the AG after she told him of her de-
sire to leave the DOJ-a conversation that made her "uncomfortable" and in
which, she gave the impression, Gonzales had coached her testimony.91
Goodling also stated that McNulty had been "not fully candid [with
Congress] about his knowledge of White House involvement in the re-
placement decision."92
C. The End for Gonzales
Eventually this constant pressure became too great for the AG, the DOJ,
and the White House to ignore. In August, Gonzales testified that senior
DOJ officials had not received political briefings from the White House, but
he was forced to amend his testimony by letter a week later, admitting that
Goodling, Sampson, and others had attended such briefings led by, among
others, Karl Rove.93 On August 24, Gonzales announced his resignation
94
without providing his reasons.
The major issue raised by these facts, allegations, and denials is self-
evident: It is extremely difficult in termination cases to understand motive
fourteen voter-fraud cases after he was added to an early version of the firing list. See Conyers
Memo, supra note 21, at 30.
90. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Norm Coleman, Statement on Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales (May 17, 2007); Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel,
Hagel Calls for Resignation of Attorney General Gonzales (May 16, 2007).
91. Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorneys Controversy and Related Matters (Part 1):
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 90 (2007) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm.
Continuing Investigation Hearings] (testimony of Monica Goodling, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of
Justice). According to Goodling, "[Gonzales] laid out for me his general recollection of ... [s]ome of
the process regarding the replacement of the U.S. attorneys .... [A]nd then he asked me... if I had any
reaction to his iteration." Id. Commentator Jon Stewart ridiculed the assumed result that Gonzales was
trying to achieve and the AG's explanation that he was trying to comfort Goodling, not influence her
testimony. Stewart mocked:
By the way, who comforts people by laying out their recollection of events? I know this is a
very difficult time for you. I also had a very difficult time between the hours of eight and
eleven a.m. on the morning of November 12, at which time I was in no way authorizing politi-
cal firings.
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast May 24, 2007), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.comvideo/index.jhtml?videold=87519&title=as-goodling-as-it-gets.
92. Judiciary Comm. Continuing Investigation Hearings, supra note 91, at 8 (testimony of
Monica Goodling). Goodling's testimony that she "crossed the line" in asking political questions of
job applicants covered by the Hatch Act led to an expanded internal investigation of DOJ hiring by
its Office of Professional Responsibility. Dan Eggen, Justice Dept. Expands Probe to Include Hiring
Practices, WASH. POST, May 31, 2007, at A4.
93. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Now Says Top Aides Got Political Briefings, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 2007, at A5.
94. See Associated Press, Gonzales' Resignation Text, SFGATE, Aug. 27, 2007, http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2007/08/27/national/w074739DO2.DTL; Letter from
Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to President George W. Bush (Aug. 26, 2007), available at http:I/
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2007/ag-resign-letter.pdf.
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and intent without something like a smoking gun email or statement.9 For
example, on the day of the firings, William Kelley sent an email stating that
Domenici's chief of staff was "happy as a clam, 96 and, a week later,
Sampson wrote to Goodling, "Domenici is going to send over names tomor-
row (not even waiting for Iglesias' body to cool)."'" Whether this is evidence
of improper interference or simply excitement at the removal of an under-
performing USA is challenging to determine.
While demonstrating pretextual dismissals is difficult, the executive's
contradictions in this case are so numerous that the "performance-related"
justification for the removals is likely pretext for removals motivated by par-
tisanship. The administration contradicted itself as follows: first, between
Gonzales's own claims regarding his involvement; 9 second, between the
White House's statement that Rove forwarded complaints from Republican
officials to the DOJ, 99 and the DOJ's previous claim that it was unaware of
Rove's role in the USA removals;'°° third, between the purpose demon-
strated by the DOJ's removal planning,' °' and the immigration rationale it
suggested to the White House for the firings;' °" and finally, between
McNulty's testimony that offered the "performance-related" justification,' °3
and the USAs' testimony regarding their performance reports and what they
were told when they were fired.'O' These contradictions indicate that per-formance was not the motivation behind the firings.' 5 However, the facts
95. As this Note went to press, the DOJ's Office of the Inspector General and Office of
Professional Responsibility jointly issued a 358-page report detailing the timeline of the USA re-
movals and analyzing the reasons for the firings. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Prof'l
Responsibility & Office of Inspector Gen., An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attor-
neys in 2006 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf.
Despite conducting approximately ninety interviews, id. at 2, and producing the most detailed USA
removal report produced to date, the DOJ was "unable to fully develop the facts regarding the re-
moval of Iglesias and several other U.S. Attorneys because of the refusal by certain key witnesses to
be interviewed" and because of "the White House's decision not to provide internal White House
documents" to the DOJ investigation, id. at 325-26.
96. Eggen & Solomon, supra note 26.
97. Email from Kyle Sampson, Deputy Chief of Staff & Counselor to the Att'y Gen., to
Monica Goodling, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Dep't of Justice (Dec. 14, 2005, 18:47 EST), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DOJDocsPt30703l3.pdf, at OAGOOOOO0125.
98. Compare note 74 and accompanying text, with note 83 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson et al., White House says Rove relayed complaints about prose-
cutors, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Mar. 11, 2007, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
whitehouse/story/l 5873.html.
100. Letter from Richard A. Hertling to Sen. Charles E. Schumer, supra note 79. Despite
contradicting the White House, Sampson's emails themselves indicate that the DOJ was aware of
Rove's involvement. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 23-33, 56 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
105. These contradictions say nothing of inconsistencies like the DOJ initially targeting nei-
ther Iglesias, nor McKay, nor Charlton, see email from Kyle Sampson to Harriet Miers, supra note
21, but then removing these USAs after influential Republicans, including members of Congress,
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that are harmful to the DOJ have only been made public due to congres-
sional interest and happenstance.' 6 If a USA facing a similar situation in the
future tried to bring a claim challenging her removal, it would be difficult
for her to produce such evidence. While the DOJ's Office of Professional
Responsibility and Office of the Inspector General have already released
reports in their investigation of the USA firings, facts indicating a clear ob-
struction of justice related to the USA firings-such as a prosecution or
decision not to prosecute motivated by a potential target's political party-
have not yet come to light. 7 If such information were available, the remov-
als would be plainly illegal." If no one unearths such facts, however,
whether these partisan, pretextual removals exceed the scope of the removal
power is a difficult inquiry because of remaining questions regarding the
president's removal power and the constitutional status of USAs.
complained about investigations-or lack of investigations-in elections or affairs implicating that
member, her family, or her close political allies, see supra notes 30, 34, 43, 46-50, 52-55 and ac-
companying text. The recent DOJ investigation into the USA firings similarly concluded that
partisan politics likely motivated at least some of the USA removals:
The most serious allegations that arose were that the U.S. Attorneys were removed based
on improper political factors, including to affect the way they handled certain voter fraud or
public corruption investigations and prosecutions. Our investigation found significant evidence
that political partisan considerations were an important factor in the removal of several of the
U.S. Attorneys. The most troubling example was David Iglesias, the U.S. Attorney in New
Mexico. We concluded that complaints from New Mexico Republican politicians and party ac-
tivists about Iglesias's handling of voter fraud and public corruption cases caused his removal,
and that the Department removed Iglesias without any inquiry into his handling of the cases.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 95, at 325-26.
106. An argument that the firing of a USA would always generate public and congressional
interest is rebutted by the fact that neither Bud Cummins's nor Todd Graves's firings were a major
public issue until the mass USA firings came to light. See Conyers Memo, supra note 21, at iii (describ-
ing the January 2006 firing but the delayed investigation of the removal of USA Todd Graves); CQ
Transcripts Wire, Transcript: U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on Dismissal of U.S.
Attorneys, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 6, 2007, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/senatejudiciary-hearingj306O7.htm 44 (illustrating that Cummins was notified in June
2006 that he was being forced to resign). This delayed outcry demonstrates that when a USA resigns
without protest, timely public protest is normally impossible.
107. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 95; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Prof'l Respon-
sibility & Office of Inspector Gen., An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica
Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General (July 28, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Prof'l Responsibility &
Office of Inspector Gen., An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of
Justice Honors Program and Summer Law Intern Program (June 24, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/oig-opr-investigation-hire-slip.pdf. On September 29, 2008, AG Michael
Mukasey named a special prosecutor, Nora Dannehy, the acting USA in Connecticut, to further the
investigation into the USA removals and determine whether any administration officials or members
of Congress should face criminal charges arising from their involvement in the removal process.
Eric Lichtblau & Sharon Otterman, Special Prosecutor Named in Attorney Firings Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30,2008, atA16.
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
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II. THE REMOVAL POWER
The Constitution does not explicitly address removal from office except
by way of impeachment." The removal power is, however, a critical tool for
the president to control the executive branch."" Section II.A addresses the
history and breadth of the removal power, focusing on the constraints that
the Supreme Court has allowed on the power. It claims that, under a plain
reading of Morrison, Congress may create indirect removal limitations for
inferior officers, provided that they neither involve Congress in the removal
process nor inhibit the president's mandate to ensure that the laws are faith-
fully executed. Section II.B concludes that Supreme Court precedent,
explicit circuit court consideration, and the role of the USA office indicate
that USAs are inferior officers within the meaning of the Constitution.
Section II.B relies on Supreme Court decisions, the Constitution, debates of
the First Congress, and subsequent historical practice to support the claim
that, despite the fact that USAs perform some "executive" functions, Con-
gress is empowered to enact removal limitations over USAs so long as the
limitations comport with Morrison. Section II.C examines a number of po-
tential theories on which a USA could challenge her removal, but concludes
that the USAs currently have no viable cause of action on which to ground
such a challenge.
A. The Source of the Removal Power and Congressional
Limitations on the President
Although the Constitution does not explicitly address the removal
power, a number of theories support it. The power is primarily grounded in
the Vesting Clause, "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America,' and the Take Care Clause, "[The President]
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.""' In what has come to
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (conferring sole power of impeachment upon the House
of Representatives); id. § 3, cl. 6 (granting sole power to try cases of impeachment to the Senate); id.
art. H, § 4 (president, vice president, and other civil officers of the United States subject to im-
peachment for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"); id. art. III, § I (judges
to have tenure during "good Behaviour").
110. See, e.g., Yoo et al., supra note 10.
11. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1.
112. Id. § 3. Though "Take Care Clause" is more common, this clause is also sometimes
referred to as the "Faithful Execution Clause." E.g., Peter M. Shane, Returning Separation-of-
Powers Analysis to Its Normative Roots: The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Pri-
vate Suits to Enforce Civil Fines, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11081, 11102 (2000). Under a third theory, the
removal power is derived from the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2, cl. 2, and "[t]he
right to remove is an incident to the power of appointment." Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (3 Pet.) 230,
253 (1839). Commentators have explained that this theory, while symmetrical, is not supported
constitutionally, practically, or historically. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an
Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 123, 161 (1994); Saikrishna Prakash. Removal
and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1834-36 (2006). But see Halliburton, supra note 14, at
214. The Supreme Court and recent administrations have seemed more reluctant to abandon this
view despite its deficiencies. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1988); 7 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 95, 97-100 (1983). A more thorough discussion of the derivation of the removal
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be known as the Decision of 1789, the First Congress concluded that the
president retained a constitutional right to remove executive officers," 3 but it
did not agree on a lone textual source for the power."4 The debate focused
on whether the president could remove officers by himself,"5 James
Madison's view, or if he needed the advice and consent of the Senate, as
originally advocated by Alexander Hamilton." 1
6
The Supreme Court first attempted to define the scope of the removal
power in Marbury v. Madison."7 Chief Justice Marshall viewed the power
narrowly, finding that an appointment created vested legal rights to office."'
While Marshall's view was merely dicta," 9 the Supreme Court has used the
reasoning behind it-that a president's removal powers may be limited
when that limitation does not infringe on his Article II duties-in subse-
quent removal decisions. "°
Recognizing that the discussion of the removal power in Marbury was
not binding, the Court in Parsons v. United States made one of its first for-
ays into the removal power, but failed to rule on the constitutional issue. 2'
The Court rejected the claim of a USA who sought pay for his entire four-
year commission despite being removed by President Cleveland. 22 The
power is beyond the scope of this Note and has been extensively discussed in the literature. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Uni-
tary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons:
The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563 (1997); Greene, supra;
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLuam. L. REV. 1
(1994); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-
Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001); Prakash, supra.
113. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-15 (1926).
114. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 658 (2004).
115. Myers, 272 U.S. at 119-33.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton). But note that, as secretary of the treas-
ury in President Washington's Cabinet, Hamilton changed his view expressed therein. Prakash,
supra note 112, at 1829.
117. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
118. In dicta, Marshall wrote:
[W]hen the officer is not removeable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revo-
cable, and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed.
... [A]s the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, inde-
pendent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal
rights, which are protected by the laws of his country.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162.
119. Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1897).
120. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1998); Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162, 165-66).
121. 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
122. See id.
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Court was not yet willing to rule on whether Congress possessed the consti-
tutional authority to restrain the president's removal power; it instead relied
on its interpretation of an act addressing the appointment power to hold that
the president had statutory authority to remove USAs' 23
In Myers v. United States, the Court subsequently changed tacks,
squarely addressing Congress's ability to limit the removal power.14 Myers
involved the firing of a postmaster notwithstanding a statute providing that
postmasters could only be removed before the end of their term with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 12 Chief Justice Taft read the framers' de-
bates and the Constitution to stand for the president's exclusive power of
removal. '26 However, even Myers conceded that Congress possessed the
power to shield inferior officers, including those who served political func-
tions, from the president's plenary removal power."'
The broad reading of presidential power in Myers lasted only eleven
years as the Court, without a former president at its head, 2 took a different
stance and limited the scope of Myers in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.'29 Unlike the split Court in Myers, 30 the Humphrey's Executor Court
unanimously upheld the authority of Congress to limit the removal of a
commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in cases of "ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office," 3 ' a standard that the Court
referred to as "for cause. ' The Court drew a distinction between "purely
executive officers," such as the postmaster in Myers, whom the president
alone could remove, and "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" officers, like
those at the FTC, for whom the president's removal power could be lim-
ited. "'33 The Court drew this distinction because it was concerned that if
Congress could not check the removal of these officers, the only check on
removal would be review by the judiciary.14
While the classification of the officer being removed is no longer a
sufficient test to determine whether Congress can limit the president's removal135
power, the Court has not fully discarded the Humphrey's Executor
123. Id. at 342-43.
124. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id. at 106, 161.
127. See id. at 173-74.
128. Taft retired from the Court in 1930. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT:
CHIEF JUSTICE 297-98 (1965).
129. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
130. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 240 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
131. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 623.
132. Id. at629.
133. id. at 629-32.
134. Id. at 629.
135. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-91 (1988).
November 2008]
Michigan Law Review
reasoning. The Court deployed it in Wiener v. United States,'36 the next major
removal power case. Wiener expanded on Humphrey's Executor, holding that
even when no statutory limit on removal existed, the president may not be
able to remove executive officers where independence from the president was
desirable.'37 Wiener was a former member of the War Claims Commission
("WCC") who had been appointed by President Truman but removed by
President Eisenhower without good cause. 3s The statute creating and
governing the WCC was silent on removal, but the Court held that the
president's removal authority over a "quasi-judicial" officer was not plenary
when there was reason that the officer should exert some independence and
that Congress may have assumed such independence in drafting the
statute. 3 9
Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court resisted the Assistant AG,
Theodore Olson, and two other executive officers in their challenge to the
constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act.'4 The Act provided that the AG could only remove the
independent counsel (IC") for good cause and would then have to file a
report with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees describing the
grounds for the removal. 4' The Court recognized that Humphrey's Executor
had rejected part of the reasoning in Myers-at least in practice-because in
allowing removal limitations for officers performing a "quasi-judicial" or
"quasi-legislative" function, 42 the Court had gone against Myers in
sanctioning removal limitations on officers who exercised some "purely
executive" functions.
43
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Morrison majority,' " engaged in a
functional analysis and clarified that an officer's description as "executive"
is not dispositive in considering whether Congress can limit the president's
removal power. 14' The critical inquiry is, first, whether an officer is a princi-
pal officer, over whom the president possesses plenary removal power, or an
inferior officer for whom congressionally-imposed removal limitations can
136. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
137. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 351-52 (3d ed. 2006).
138. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350.
139. Id. at 352, 354-56. While the Court continued to rely on Wiener's function as the key
issue in the case, Wiener remains important today for its holding that where independence from the
president is desirable, the Court may be more willing to find an outer limit to the president's re-
moval power. See id. at 352-56.
140. 487 U.S. at 659-62.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(l)-(2) (2000).
142. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687-91; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935).
143. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution that Wasn 't, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 47, 52 (2004).
144. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659.
145. Id. at 689-90.
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be constitutional. 46 Second, if the officer is an inferior officer, the Court
asks whether the limitation on the removal power with regard to that officer
interferes with "the President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his
constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted' under Article 11.'
41
The Court held that the IC was an inferior officer and that the good
cause limitation was not an unconstitutional limit on the president's Article
II grant.14 8 It explicitly rejected the reasoning that limitations could not be
placed on the president's removal power in cases involving officials who
serve "core executive functions.' 1 9 The Court also upheld the provision of
the Act stating that the decision by the AG to remove for good cause was
subject to judicial review, finding "no constitutional problem in the fact that
the Act provides for judicial review of the removal decision."'5 It stated that
judicial review of the AG's removal decision in such a case "is a function
that is well within the traditional power of the Judiciary."''
In a lone dissent Justice Scalia claimed that the case was straightforward
and that the majority's approach in relying on the IC's function was incor-
rect. 15 For Scalia, the only relevant inquiries were whether the IC's exercise
of prosecutorial power was executive power, and if it was, whether the Act
deprived the president of any control over that prosecutorial power.'53 Scalia
concluded that the IC's prosecutorial role was "a quintessentially executive
function" from which it followed that any limitation on the president's con-
trol over the IC was a constitutionally defective violation of separation of
powers principles. 
54
In rejecting Justice Scalia's formalistic inquiry,'55 Morrison suggests that
congressional limits on the removal power are constitutional so long as they
do not "unduly trammel[] on executive authority."' 5 6 Many commentators
agree that Congress can provide such limits on the removal of inferior offi-
cers. 15' The Court has long recognized the principle that when Congress
146. See id.
147. Id. at 690.
148. Id. at691.
149. Id. at 688.
150. Id. at 693 n.33.
151. Id. at695.
152. See id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See id.
154. Id at 705-08.
155. Seeid. at 705.
156. Id. at 691 (majority opinion); see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 112, at 1167
(conceding this reading of Morrison but noting that the Supreme Court's approach to removal is
"hopelessly contradictory").
157. See, e.g., Halliburton, supra note 14, at 215; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 117-
18; see also Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause and the Removal Power: Theory and
Sdance, 60 TENN. L. REv. 841, 861 (1993) ("Congress's ability to fetter the President's discretion in
removing inferior officers has never been seriously doubted" (citing United States v. Perkins, 116
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vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments, it
retains the ability to limit the Executive's exercise of the removal power by
statute. 5 The constitutional challenge for Congress is thus twofold: identify
which officers are inferior and enact removal limits that do not violate the
principles from Morrison.'59
B. U.S. Attorneys Are Inferior Officers for Whom Congress Is
Constitutionally Empowered to Enact Removal Limitations
Whether USAs are primary or inferior officers is a threshold inquiry for
Congress's ability to limit their removal, but drawing such a line is difficult.
The Constitution does not define the term "inferior officer," and recognition of
this demarcation difficulty is not new.' 6 The Court has interpreted the Ap-
pointments Clause as creating two classes of executive officers. '6 "Principal
officers" are nominated by the president and appointed with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Constitution allows Congress to designate the
appointment process and limit removal for "inferior officers.' 63 In finding
the IC to be an inferior officer, the Morrison Court declined to provide a
generally applicable line between principal and inferior officers.' 64 The
Court based its finding that the IC was an inferior officer on the following
factors: she held her office subject to removal by the AG, she possessed lim-
U.S. 483 (1886))). What types of limitations are permissible for primary officers, if any, is debat-
able; however, as this Note claims that USAs are inferior officers, see discussion infra Section lI.B.,
such a discussion is unnecessary here.
158. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 159-61 (1926); United States v. Perkins, 116
U.S. 483 (1886). A more difficult question is whether Congress can limit the removal of inferior
officers for whom it has not vested appointment authority in a department head. See infra note 163.
159. See discussion infra Section Ill.B.
160. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
362 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).
161. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1878).
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976). Some inferior officers, such as USAs, are
appointed by advice and consent, 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000), but this is the result of Congress
choosing to impose that method of appointment by statute, see id.
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988). A sub-
sidiary issue to the inferior officer discussion is whether Congress must exercise its constitutional
authority to vest the appointment of an inferior officer in someone other than the President (with the
advice and consent of the Senate) in order to be able to enact removal limitations. Myers, in demur-
ring from the previous claims of Justice Story, see 2 STORY, supra note 160, stated that Congress
could only create removal limitations for inferior officers when those officers were appointed in
some other way. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 162 (1926) (citing with approval United
States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886)); see also CHARLES E. MORGANSTON, THE APPOINTING AND
REMOVAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 133 (1929). However, Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-31 (1935) and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349,
350-52 (1958), allowed removal limitations for officers appointed by the President with Senate
advice and consent. While the question is thus not resolved, even if a court were to require that
Congress vest the appointment of the USAs, for any of the legislative options discussed below, see
discussion infra Section 1I.B, Congress could vest the appointment in the AG with advice and con-
sent. This would satisfy any constitutional concern arising from Myers and would not, in practice,
limit the President's role in the appointment process due to presidential control of the AG.
164. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
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ited duties, her authority was tempered by DOJ policy, her jurisdiction was
not plenary, and her tenure was temporally limited. 6s
Subsequent to Morrison, the Supreme Court clarified its delineation of
principal and inferior officers in Edmond v. United States, laying the
groundwork for appellate courts to conclude that USAs are inferior offi-
cers.' 66 In Edmond, the Court upheld the Secretary of Transportation's
appointment of judges of the U.S. Coast Guard Court of Appeals, holding
that such judges are inferior officers primarily because the judges' work is
supervised by a politically accountable principal officer. 67 The Court
reached this holding despite the presence of only one of the considerations
from Morrison,1s and did not follow the Morrison factors as if they consti-
tuted a test. '69 Relying on Edmond, the only courts that have squarely
addressed the proper categorization of USAs have held that they are inferior
officers. 17 The primary reason underlying this determination is that USAs
are closely supervised by the AG, 17' a principal officer who is politically
accountable through the Senate. 72
The Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") has also concluded that USAs are
inferior officers. Like many commentators,'73 the DOJ has opined that the
165. Id. at 671-72.
166. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661-64 (1997).
167. Id. The Edmond Court wrote:
[Tihe term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or offi-
cers below the President: Whether one is an "inferior" officer depends on whether he has a
superior. It is not enough that other officers may be identified who formally maintain a higher
rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that were the intention, the Constitu-
tion might have used the phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to
preserve political accountability relative to important Government assignments, we think it
evident that "inferior officers" are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some
level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
Id. at 662-63 (emphasis added).
168. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72 (stating that the removal factors, pre-Edmond, are
whether the officer is: "subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official;" "empowered by
the Act to perform only certain, limited duties;" "limited in jurisdiction;" and "limited in tenure").
169. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661-65. Commentators and at least one court have recognized
the tension between these decisions. United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 25 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000)
("[T]he Court's 1997 decision in Edmond v. United States essentially displaced the faulty Appoint-
ments Clause analysis of Morrison v. Olson." (citing Steven G. Calabresi, Foreword, The Structural
Constitution and the Countermajoritarian Difficult, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 5 (1998) (al-
teration in original)); Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1117-20 (1998)).
170. E.g., United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gantt, 194
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Baker, 504 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
171. Gantt, 194 F.3d at 999. The court noted that it was deciding the constitutional issue in the
context of an interim USA but that there should be no distinction because interim USAs possess the
same powers as non-interim USAs and are to be distinguished from "Acting" USAs. Id. at 999 n.5.
172. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 143, at 61-62; Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments
After the Independent Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV.
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Court has failed to provide clear guidance for the inquiry into whether an
officer is inferior. 174 OLC has also agreed with courts analyzing Morrison in
light of Edmond by finding that the Morrison factors do not constitute an
exclusive or exhaustive list of considerations as to the proper categorization
of an officer.'75 Despite these difficulties, the DOJ has found that USAs are
inferior officers, relying heavily on the fact that their exercise of discretion
is governed by the AG and not directly by the president.1
76
The USAs are thus inferior officers for whom Congress can statutorily
limit removal, provided that such a limitation does not interfere with the
president's Article II grant. The decision in Edmond called into question the
importance of the Morrison factors, providing precedent for the inferior
officer interpretation. 77 That precedent in combination with courts of
appeals opinions," the executive branch's repeated arguments for such an
interpretation, 1 and the agreement of the Congressional Research Service
and commentators'80 counsels strongly for the determination that USAs
constitute inferior officers. Because USAs are inferior officers, Congress
possesses the constitutional authority to narrowly limit their removal
provided such a limitation neither interferes with "the President's exercise of
the 'executive power'" nor his "duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully
executed' under Article 11.,,181
Regardless of whether a USA is an inferior officer, however, whether a
USA is a "purely executive officer" remains important after Morrison. Be-
fore Morrison, the constitutionality of congressional limits on removal
turned largely on whether an officer was "purely executive."'8 2 Morrison
363, 405-06 (2001) (describing the "ad hoc" nature of the Court's principal-inferior distinction but
determining that USAs are principal officers).
174. 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 124, 149 (1996).
175. Id. at 150 (citing Silver v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991)).
176. 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 58, 58-59 (1978) (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397
(1879)); see also 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 150.
177. See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
179. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the government
argued that all USAs should be categorized as inferior officers); United States v. Baker, 504 F. Supp.
2d 402, 406 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (noting that the government claimed in its briefs that USAs are infe-
rior officers); supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
180. House Confirmation Process Hearings, supra note 66, at 132 (statement of T.J. Halstead,
Legislative Att'y, Am. Law Div., Cong. Research Serv.); Levenson, supra note 8, at 306-15. But see
Wiener, supra note 173, at 405-06. At least one recent commentator has noted that "[n]o court,
however, has agreed with Wiener's assessment .... [S]ince the time of his article, it appears that
U.S. Attorneys have enjoyed less freedom and discretion than what Wiener described." Levenson,
supra note 8, at 316.
181. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988); supra note 147 and accompanying
text; see also Yoo et al., supra note 10, at 695 (disagreeing with the Morrison Court's "apparent
conclusion that even officers performing such core executive functions as prosecution could be
insulated from presidential removal").
182. See supra notes 124-139 and accompanying text.
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rejected this formalism, and followed a functional analysis."3 The majority
in Morrison did, however, make clear that there is at least an issue as to
whether the officer for whom Congress seeks to limit removal is properly
categorized as "purely executive. '
There is no clear evidence that the framers considered prosecution a nec-
essarily executive function. The history of colonial prosecution is
characterized by individual prosecutions, district attorneys performing non-
prosecutorial duties, locally based public prosecutions, and colonial and state
constitutions that did not consider prosecution an exclusively executive func-
tion. ' The framers appear to have contemplated neither the AG nor the DOJ
as both the Constitution and the debates of the Constitutional Convention omit
any mention of the DOJ's creation despite discussion of other executive agen-
cies. 1 6 Nor did Publius enumerate law enforcement in the list of functions
that are "peculiarly within the province of the executive department."' 8 7 As
originally drafted, the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted courts the authority to
appoint USAs,"' suggesting that the framers did not view prosecution as
executive."' 9 For almost one hundred years there was virtually no executive
branch supervision of USAs following appointment, despite efforts of AG
Randolph to bring the prosecutors under his control.' 90 The USAs operated
with a degree of independence and displayed little loyalty to the executive
branch.' 9' The resulting administrative difficulty, not the Constitution, wasthe primary motivation for the 1870 act creating the DOJ and expressly
183. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-91.
184. Id. at 690 ("Myers was undoubtedly correct in its holding, and in its broader suggestion
that there are some 'purely executive' officials who must be removable by the President at will if he
is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role."); see also supra notes 140-151 and accompanying
text. The Court went on to state: "We do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the functions served by
the officials at issue is irrelevant." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691. The value of a formalistic assessment is
furthered by the almost complete turnover in the composition of the Court since Morrison was decided.
The only Justice in the 7-1 Morrison majority still serving as of publication of this Note is Justice
Stevens.
185. Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v.
Olson and the Framers'Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071 (1990); John A. Fairlie, The United States
Department of Justice, 3 MICH. L. REV. 352, 358 (1905).
186. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 625 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
187. THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (Alexander Hamilton).
188. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 49, 108-09 (1923-1924).
189. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 567.
190. See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 142-60 (1937) (describ-
ing the office of the Attorney General before the creation of the Department of Justice); Letter from
Edmund Randolph, Att'y Gen., to President George Washington (Dec. 26, 1791), reprinted in I
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, CLASS X, MISCELLANEOUS 45-46 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin,
eds., 1834).
191. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 190, at 218; Letter from Edmund Randolph
to President George Washington, supra note 190, at 45-46.
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placing USAs under the supervision and control of the AG. 92 It was not un-
til almost one hundred years after the ratification of the Constitution that
USAs came under the practical control of the president. 93
Because of this uncertainty surrounding the framers' view of prosecu-
tion, Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison becomes more questionable as a
basis for rejecting limitations on the removal of USAs. Scalia claimed that
there is "no possible doubt" that the IC's role in investigation and prosecu-
tion is "a quintessentially executive function.' 94  However, numerous
commentators have examined the historical record and claim that there are
no grounds for certainty as to the framers' views of prosecution.' 95 One
commentator has noted that the AG's position is "quasi judicial.' ' 96 If prose-
cution was not understood by the framers as an executive function, this
counsels for allowance of congressional removal limits over USAs as infe-
rior officers even under a formalistic analysis. 9 7 Regardless, such a claim
regarding prosecution supports, but is not necessary to sustain, the argument
that removal limits for USAs are constitutional, because of the Morrison
Court's allowance of such limits for an inferior officer whom it found "ex-
ecutive."'98 After Morrison the fact that a presidential appointee performs
some executive functions is no longer dispositive for a reviewing court to
reject congressional removal limitations.199
192. See Act to establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). As Lessig &
Sunstein recount, from 1789 to 1820 the federal district attorneys reported to "no one," and from
1820 through 1861 they reported to the Secretary of the Treasury, who, at that time, reported to
Congress. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 16-17.
193. But see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 112, at 658-59; Angela J. Davis, The American
Prosecutor: Independence, Power and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 453-57 (2001).
194. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra notes 153-
154 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and
S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
(1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics Hearings]; Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent
Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv. 105, 126-28 (1988); Dangel, supra note 185; Harold J. Krent,
Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
275, 286-90 (1989); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 15-22; Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics
Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1096-1101
(2004).
196. Fairlie, supra note 185, at 353. But see Note, Removing Politics from the Justice Depart-
ment: Constitutional Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366, 397 (1975)
("Prosecutorial discretion and law enforcement may not be exclusive or illimitable functions of the
executive branch, but they are, according to the prevalent view, prerogatives of the executive and are
not easily severed from that branch.").
197. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705, 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 690-93 (majority opinion).
199. See supra notes 140-151 and accompanying text; see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary J.
Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1144(2000).
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C. The U.S. Attorneys Lack a Viable Cause of
Action to Challenge Their Removals
Despite Congress's constitutional authority to limit the removal of
USAs, the enforceability of a removal limitation is undermined by the fact
that the USAs themselves cannot currently bring an action challenging an
improper removal or seeking damages. As a Senate-confirmed presidentialS 200
appointee, a USA is unable to challenge her removal through the proce-
dure available to most federal employees: the Merit Systems Protection
Board.20' In addition, three of the most common constitutional claims for
wrongful dismissal-the protection of free speech, a due process property
interest in employment, and a due process liberty interest in remaining free
from incorrect reputation-damaging charges upon discharge-though seem-
ingly implicated on the facts of the dismissals,2 0 2 are not available to the
USAs.
Public employees may challenge dismissals by claiming that the firing
violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and association; how-
ever, that path is unavailable to USAs. The Supreme Court has held that a
person cannot be forced to forfeit her First Amendment protections as a
condition of public employment, 20' but the prohibition on encroachment of
speech is not absolute. 2°' Generally, if an employee fired for her speech can
demonstrate that the speech at issue is a matter of "public concern,"'2 , a
court will engage in a balancing test between the interest of the fired em-
ployee and the employer-state in serving the public. 20 6 Despite the Court
finding significant safeguards for employees in the First Amendment, 7
200. Federal employees are typically divided into the Senior Executive Service, a cadre of
high-level positions that are not appointed by the President or confirmed by the Senate, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 3132(a)(2) (2006), the Competitive Service, the majority of federal employees who are hired
through the merit hiring system, see 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (2006); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE
EXCEPTED SERVICE 1 (1997), or the excepted service, the employees who are outside both other
systems, see 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (2006). USAs, however, are presidential appointees, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 541 (2000), who-for formal employment purposes-are designated as "Presidential Appointment
with Senate Confirmation" and whose salaries are determined not by a federal pay table but by
"administrative determination." See H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSI-
TIONS ("THE PLUM BOOK") v, 96-98 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/
2004/2004_plum book.pdf; see also JUSTICE MGMT. Div. PERS. STAFF, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRANSI-
TION 2002 HUMAN RESOURCES BRIEFING GUIDE App. B (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
jmd/ps/guitrans.htm#pas.
201. See infra notes 276-282 and accompanying text.
202. See discussion supra Part I (describing potentially reputation-damaging statements that
DOJ officials made about the fired USAs as well as perceived threats made against the USAs if they
continued to publicly criticize the DOJ).
203. See Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
204. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
205. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). Whether speech is a matter of public
concern is governed by "the content, form, and context of a given statement." Id. at 147-48.
206. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
207. In practice, the Court's jurisprudence in this area has created relatively robust protections
for public employees' speech. For example, in Rankin v. McPherson the Supreme Court held that a
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USAs do not enjoy such protection because they are "policymaking" em-
2081ployees .
Neither can the USAs bring a due process claim based on a property in-
terest in their positions. Property interests in employment are statutory-not
constitutional-entitlements. 209 The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted
"property" protection,2'0 but if an employee's status is provisional, unten-
ured, or otherwise lacking a reasonable basis for an entitlement to her
employment, an employee does not have a property interest in her employ-
ment."' Government employees who serve as at-will employees do not have
a property interest in their continued employment, 2 and as presidential ap-
pointees,2 3 USAs have no such expectation and possess no property interest
in their positions.24
Finally, USAs cannot prove that their removals were so stigmatizing that
they were deprived of a constitutionally protected "liberty" interest. A series
of Supreme Court cases regarding liberty deprivation has created the
"stigma plus" standard, which requires a showing of damage to reputation
coupled with loss of employment.211 Courts typically rely on three broad
constable's office violated a clerical employee's First Amendment protections by dismissing her
when, discussing the failed assassination attempt of President Reagan, she stated that "'if they go
for him again, I hope they get him."' 483 U.S. 378, 381, 392 (1987).
208. The Court has clarified that the formal "policymaking" label is not the "ultimate inquiry"
as to an employee's First Amendment Rights. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). It has also
conceded that "[n]o clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions,"
Elrod, 427 U.S at 367, and that the focus of the inquiry should be on "[tihe nature of the responsi-
bilities," and whether the employee "formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals." Id. at
367-68. The Court has, however, emphasized an employee's function, noting that an "employee
with responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more likely functions in a poli-
cymaking position," id. at 368, and employees with access to "confidential documents that
influenced policymaking deliberations" were more likely to fall under the exception as well. Branti,
445 U.S. at 511. A USA "exercises wide discretion in the use of his/her resources to further the
priorities of the local jurisdictions and needs of their [sic] communities," United States Department
of Justice, United States Attorneys Mission Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao (last visited Aug.
22, 2008), and is almost certainly a policymaking official both formally and functionally. See Branti,
445 U.S. at 519 & n. 13 (contrasting the role of the public defender for whom the Court found First
Amendment protections with that of the prosecutor whose job includes "broader public responsibili-
ties"); cf id. at 523 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court's vague, overbroad decision may cast
serious doubt on the propriety of dismissing United States attorneys, as well as thousands of other
policymaking employees at all levels of government, because of their membership in a national
political party.").
209. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
210. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
211. See, e.g., Eddings v. City of Hot Springs, 323 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2003); Baron v. Port
Auth., 271 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001).
212. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-47 (1976); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown,
455 F.3d 225, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2006); Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230-31 (5th
Cir. 1993).
213. See supra note 200.
214. See Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1097 n.4, 1101 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Fiorentino v. United States, 607 F2d 963, 966-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Commeree v. Hantman, No. Civ.
97-0242, 1999 WL 1611325, at *5 (D.D.C Oct. 28, 1999).
215. See Bishop, 426 U.S. at 343, 348 (rejecting a liberty infringement claim of a police offi-
cer after statements about his poor performance were made during pretrial discovery); Paul v. Davis,
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requirements that the employee must meet. First, the employee must show
that the stigmatization was not solely a reputational injury but occurred in
connection with the termination of his employment.1 6 Second, the stigma-
tizing statements must be made public; internal, deliberative charges do not
equate with a stigmatizing injury."' Third, the employee must show that he
has been stigmatized by his employer and not a third party."8 There is wide-
spread precedent that holds that a dismissal for performance or
incompetence, as opposed to a more damaging charge such as dishonesty,
immorality, or criminality, is not sufficiently stigmatizing for a liberty in-
fringement claim unless such a charge significantly restricts future
employment opportunities. 2 9 Because the only pretextual charge the DOJ
leveled against the USAs was that they were fired for "performance-related
reasons,"'22 and because the USAs subsequently secured employment, 22 they
22
would likely be unable to bring a liberty interest infringement claim.
424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (rejecting a liberty infringement claim arising from the Louisville
Police Department's use of an "Active Shoplifters" poster with the plaintiff's picture because dam-
age to reputation alone was not enough to implicate Fourteenth Amendment guarantees); Roth, 408
U.S. at 573 (rejecting a liberty infringement claim of a public university professor after his contract
was not renewed without reason); see, e.g., Graham v. City of Philadelphia, 402 F.3d 139 (3d Cir.
2005); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005); Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322 (2d Cir.
2004); Lighton v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996,
999 (4th Cir. 1990). Paul v. Davis is often cited as the case creating the "stigma plus" standard. See,
e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991).
216. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
217. See, e.g., Sims v. Fox, 492 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1974).
218. See, e.g., McMath v. City of Gary, 976 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1992); Brennan v.
Hendrigan, 888 E2d 189, 196 (1st Cir. 1989).
219. See, e.g., Dasey v. Anderson, 304 F.3d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that private
showing for purposes of termination hearing of police officer smoking marijuana is insufficiently
public to be stigmatizing); Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630 (2d
Cir. 1996) (stating that an employee fired for incompetence only suffers a liberty deprivation if the
charges of incompetence are sufficiently serious to hinder future employment); Portman v. County
of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 908 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the court was focusing on the lack of
moral turpitude in a termination letter); Robinson v. City of Montgomery City, 809 F.2d 1355, 1356
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city press release from the board of aldermen and distributed locally
was not sufficiently stigmatizing); Brouillette v. Bd. of Dirs. of Merged Area IX, 519 F.2d 126, 128
(8th Cir. 1975) (noting that charges against a teacher of tardiness and an inability to maintain order
are "relatively minor" and are not charges that rise to the level of constitutional protection).
220. See supra notes 61-63, 98-105 and accompanying text.
22 1. See John Cook, Fired federal attorney McKay to join Getty Images, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 2007, at El; Schmitt, supra note 4.
222. Even if USAs could show stigmatization providing grounds for a liberty infringement
claim, such a showing would be a pyrrhic victory because it would not entitle the USAs to damages
or reinstatement. The remedy mandated for a liberty infringement under the Due Process Clause is
merely a name-clearing hearing that provides "an opportunity to refute the charge" underlying the
dismissal. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). A further difficulty for the USAs is that
even if they could articulate a constitutional claim, they would be unable to seek damages through a
Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), because the claim would arise out of their federal employment, a "special factor" in the
Court's Bivens jurisprudence, see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983).
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III. THE NEED FOR ACTION AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION: REVISITING
LEGISLATION AND DELINEATING THE REMOVAL POWER THROUGH
EMPLOYMENT LAW PRINCIPLES
This Part argues that the removal of the USAs implicates issues of ex-
ecutive overreach for which Congress is normatively justified in providing a
legislative check. It names and examines four possible statutory vehicles
through which Congress could constitutionally assert itself in partisan re-
movals of USAs: the Independent Appointment and Removal Model, the
Civil Service Due Process Amendments Model, the Independent Counsel
Model, and the Accountability Model. Looking to the Constitution, Supreme
Court precedent, post-Watergate congressional hearings, and the current
Congress's reaction to the USA removals, Section III.A explores the norma-
tive justifications for Congress to provide a statutory limit to USA removals,
particularly given the administration's pretextual explanations for the firings
described in Part I. Section III.B examines four potential legislative frame-
works, three borrowed from prior legislation, and one a new hybrid, which
this Note advocates adopting. Section III.C offers the McDonnell Douglas
line of cases to rebut the claim that unpacking a distinction between "parti-
san" removals and "political" removals is not a judicially manageable task.
A. Supplementing the Political Check: There Is
a Need for Congressional Action
Congress would be constitutionally permitted, historically consistent,
and normatively justified in creating a statutory cause of action for a USA to
challenge, or at least call attention to, what she claimed was an improper
removal . 23 As described above, Morrison confirms that the Constitution
does not bar congressional limits to executive power over inferior officers if
those limits do not interfere with the president's capacity to perform his ex-
ecutive duties, including his ability to "'take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.' ,,224 The constitutional arguments account for why Congress is
223. As this Note argues infra, in a future case involving a situation similar to the USAs'
dismissal or the Marston Affair, the claim of impropriety would be based on an assertion that purely
partisan removals are improper as they do not further the president's Article II grant. See discussion
infra Section II.C. At least two commentators have informally argued this limit to the removal
power. See Posting of Michael C. Doff to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2007/03/executive-
privilege-contempt-of.html (Mar. 20, 2007, 00:02 EST); Posting of Michael C. Doff to Doff on Law,
http://michaeldorf.org/2007/03/dont-say-political-say-partisan.html (Mar. 19, 2007, 08:19 EST);
Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/03/did-anyone-in-
white-house-act.html (Mar. 21, 2007, 23:12 EST).
224. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. H, § 3); see
also Magill, supra note 143, at 51-52 (claiming the "important change" from a focus on whether the
officer that Congress seeks to limit is "exercising 'purely executive' authority" to whether the limit
impairs the president's duty to " 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed'.... makes one sit
up and take notice"); Halliburton, supra note 14, at 215 ("[Tlhe President's otherwise plenary au-
thority is limitable only if independence in the position is constitutionally desirable, and only if the
limitation does not prohibit removal altogether, but instead retains some version of a 'good cause'
provision."); discussion supra Section ll.B.
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able to limit USA removals, but there are also a number of justifications for
why Congress should enact such a statute. First, there is both a long histori-
cal recognition and a present normative justification for a modicum of
225independence in the DOJ, the AG, and the offices of USAs. Second,
Congress has historically shown concern when it believes that the DOJ is
226becoming atypically political. Third, the current Congress has expressed
its misgivings with the pretextual firings of the USAs and the partisan ra-
tionale underlying the firings . 27  Finally, these concerns regarding
independence and partisanship are particularly strongly supported when the
constitutional scheme to check the removal power is political, and the fir-
228ings were designed precisely to subvert that political check.
The dual role of the DOJ and USAs has long provided a normative pol-
icy justification-apart from the justifications offered by the framers and the
First Congress-for independence in the administration of justice and some
insulation from partisan pressures. 229 The complexity and difficulty of the
230
relationships between USAs, the AG, and the president is longstanding.
Yet, the Supreme Court has long recognized a USA's "peculiar" duty to ap-
2311ply the law justly, in addition to her duty to serve the president. In 1940,
AG Robert Jackson spoke of the balance of independence and presidential
control required for a USA to appropriately discharge her sometimes com-
232peting duties. The first centralized federal prosecution in the United States
was conducted by the Comptroller of the Treasury, who Congress eventually
gave the power "'to direct suits and legal proceedings.' ,233 The Comptroller
was not controlled by the president and it was generally agreed that he was
225. See infra notes 233-244, 249-256 and accompanying text.
226. See infra 233-244 and accompanying text.
227. See discussion supra Part I; infra 245-248 and accompanying text.
228. See discussion supra Part I; infra notes 249-256 and accompanying text.
229. See discussion supra Section 11.B; U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 95, at 330 ("We
believe that removing U.S. Attorneys based on their lack of political support could affect the integ-
rity and independence of the Department's prosecutive decisions and the public's confidence that
such decisions are insulated from political considerations.").
230. See DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE 4 (1980); see generally Eisenstein, supra note 7 (describing the tensions between
USAs and "Main Justice").
231. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The Court stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the ser-
vant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
Id.
232. Robert H. Jackson, Att'y Gen., Address at the Second Annual Conference of United
States Attorneys: The Federal Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
3 (1940).
233. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 17 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 45, § 10, 3
Stat. 366, 367).
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"'relatively independent.' ,,2 Madison, one of the ardent advocates during
the Decision of 1789 of giving the president the removal power,"' noted that
the Comptroller-who made decisions as to the lawfulness of individuals'
• ,,116 •• ,
actions-therefore had a "judiciary quality as well as executive. Madison
went on to state that "there may be strong reasons why an officer of this
kind should not hold his office at the pleasure of the executive branch of the
Government."23 7 More recent commentators have recognized that the AG is
both personally and professionally bound to apply the law fairly and evenly
to all citizens and that such values are undermined by the threat of partisan
dismissals.2 38
Congress has historically shown concern for excessive partisanship at
the DOJ and with USAs. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there was "virtu-
ally complete agreement" that it was improper for the president to remove a
U.S. Attorney for partisan reasons. 2 9 After Watergate, congressional consid-
eration of the DOJ's independence, 4 0 and President Carter's pledge to make
241the DOJ non-political, there were lengthy debates regarding the appropri-
242
ate role of the DOJ. In his testimony on USA appointment and removal
reforms in 1978, AG Griffin Bell testified-not surprisingly-that USAs
need to be controlled by the president rather than Congress. 243 Bell did, how-
ever, concede that one of the few clear improprieties a USA could commit
would be to enforce the law with an eye toward "partisan politics."
244
The current Congress has clearly demonstrated its concern with pretex-
tual justifications for partisan firings. Throughout the House and Senate
hearings on removal of the USAs, it was clear that many members of Con-
245gress viewed the removals as improper and perhaps unconstitutional. In
passing legislation rescinding the authority of the AG to appoint interim
USAs without Senate advice and consent, some senators expressed concerns
234. Id. (citing DARRELL H. SMITH, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, Ac-
TIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 22 (1927)).
235. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
236. Id. at 635-36.
237. Id. at 636. "I do not say the office is either executive or judicial; I think it rather distinct
from both, though it partakes of each, and therefore some modification, accommodated to those
circumstances, ought to take place. I would, therefore, make the officer responsible to every part of
the Government." Id. at 638. But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 17 n.70 (claiming that
"too much of the anti-unitarian case may be resting upon this single speech by Madison").
238. E.g., MEADOR, supra note 230, at 1; Eisenstein, supra note 7, at 260-61.
239. See Eisenstein, supra note 7, at 234.
240. See Removing Politics Hearings, supra note 195.
241. See House Marston Hearings, supra note 2, at 104-05.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 45 (testimony of Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Att'y Gen.).
244. Id. at 46. AG Bell also claimed that he would discharge a USA who politicized her of-
fice. Id.
245. See discussion supra Part I.
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with improper partisanship within the DOJ.246 The chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Congressman Conyers, released a detailed report on
the firings, claiming that it was "widely accepted" that USAs should not be
removed as punishment for their exercise of prosecutorial discretion as it
247
relates to the political advantage of one party. The report specifically cited
"pretextual" removals and contemplates types of legislation to limit the re-
moval power.24'
A final normative reason for Congress to enact a statute limiting USAs'
removal is that a pretextual removal disables the constitutional checks that
underlie and buttress the removal power itself. Looking first from the per-
spective of the "fountainhead" of the Supreme Court's appointment and
removal jurisprudence-separation of powers-a limitation that would al-
low USAs to challenge a pretextual removal seems desirable.24 The
Constitution's system of divisions and separation of powers was "deliber-
ately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and open debate on the great
issues affecting the people. ' 250 The Supreme Court recognized as much in
Morrison. The Morrison Court respected the difference between the direct
congressional involvement that the Court rejected in Myers and the indirect,
"good cause" removal restrictions that the Court allowed in Humphrey's
Executor.5
In the USAs' context, vigorous debate is critical because the primary
252
check on an abuse of the removal power is political. Consider an ardent
formalist who contends that every officer exercising any federal authority
must be removable at will by the president.21' Even he or she must recognize
that if one is concerned with the procedural protections that robust separa-
254tion of powers provides, allowing an executive branch strategy of
undermining the political check will reduce accountability. If USAs are not
doing their job, or the administration makes a decision regarding appoint-
ment and removal, the president pays the political cost.21' However, he
cannot pay this cost if that administration purposefully misleads the public
and Congress about the performance of the USAs and the reason for their
246. See 153 CONG. REC. S 1993-97 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2007) (statements of Sens. Leahy and
Feinstein).
247. Conyers Memo, supra note 21, at 32-33.
248. Id. at 25, 32-62; see also infra note 259 and accompanying text.
249. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
251. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694-96; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629-30 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926); Magill, supra note 143, at 52.
252. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 728-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 793 (2001) (citing Calabresi & Prakash, supra note
112, at 593-99).
254. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of
Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 601 (1986).
255. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 728-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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removals. This is one of a number of reasons that there is almost no criti-
cism of the wholesale replacement of USAs when a new president comes
into office: the removals are conducted openly, and the president must (and
is easily able to) justify to the public why he is replacing the USAs.257
B. Frameworks for Congressional Action:
Revisiting Old Statutory Models
Congress has begun to consider whether a statutory remedy is appropri-
ate to address the administration's efforts to undermine the constitutional
structure through its subversion of the political check.28 The chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee has written that due to the USA investigation,
"Congress may wish to consider some limitation on removal of U.S. Attor-
neys, such as requiring that they may be replaced only for some cause, or
imposing other procedural or substantive limits on the removal of U.S. At-
torneys in the middle of a presidential term." '259 If Congress chooses to act,
the focus will shift to finding the appropriate balance between the presi-
dent's executive power-including his ability to faithfully execute the
laws-and providing for traditional notions of prosecutorial independence
and an active political check on the exercise of the removal power.
When faced with problematic adverse personnel actions against U.S. of-
ficers in the past, Congress has considered and implemented various
statutory responses. Congressional solutions to reduce the partisanship of
personnel decisions have often included expanding the class of officers for
260whom removal is subject to a "good cause" limitation. Congress has also
previously considered reporting requirements that mandate a report accom-
2611panying a removal, explaining why an officer was fired.
Any legislation limiting the removal of USAs should be designed not to
further congressional aggrandizement, but rather to protect the constitutional
256. See discussion supra Part 1.
257. See Eisenstein, supra note 7, at 233 (noting that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Clinton,
and George W. Bush undertook a wholesale replacement of USAs at the beginning of their presidential
terms); House Confirmation Process Hearings, supra note 66 (statement of T.J. Halstead, Legislative
Att'y, Am. Law Div., Cong. Research Serv.) (noting the "normal turnover" in USAs when a new presi-
dent comes into office). In contrast, the involuntary removal of a large number of USAs in the
middle of a term-especially when personal conduct is not at issue-is unprecedented. See KEVIN
M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE SERVED LESS THAN FULL FOUR-
YEAR TERMS, 1981-2006, at 5-7 (2007) (finding that most USAs serving fewer than a full term had
left for other prestigious government positions and that a significant minority had resigned due to
misconduct). Another reason for such removals is a president's logical claim that it is necessary
under the Vesting Clause of the Take Care Clause to have at least some of his "own men" across all
of the USA offices upon beginning his administration.
258. See discussion supra Part I. The primary check on the removal power is political.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 728-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. Conyers Memo, supra note 21, at 32-33.
260. Indeed, the current House Judiciary Committee has considered the possibility of such a
provision for USAs. See id. The benefits and constitutionality of this proposal may depend on the
manner in which Congress limits the scope of removal.
261. See S. 2803, 93d Cong. § 2 (1973).
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value of accountability, strengthen the political check, and assure the USAs'
individual rights. Providing the USAs with a cause of action rather than al-
lowing Congress to directly reserve a veto over removal decisions is
preferable-and perhaps necessary-for two reasons. First, the Constitution
likely requires this more restrained congressional approach. As Morrison
demonstrates, removal limits for inferior officers are constitutional so long
as they "do[] not interfere with the President's exercise of the 'executive
power' and his constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed' under Article 1I.,,262 Indeed, when Congress has claimed
a coercive role in the removal process, the Court has rejected such aggran-
dizement.26' However, when Congress has instead empowered an officer to
challenge her removal, the Court has generally allowed the removal limita-
264tion. Second, empowering an individual USA is normatively preferable to
ensure executive control of the DOJ and the operation of the political check
on removal abuses. So long as the president is able to remove a USA for
failing to implement a policy, the executive power can be retained. 265
1. The Independent Appointment and Removal Model
A first possible legislative response, which Congress has previously con-
sidered, is removing the DOJ entirely from the president's control; however,
this solution is almost certainly unconstitutional. During the 1970s, Con-
gress focused on the politicization of the DOJ and the offices of USAs
because of Watergate, President Carter's pledge to make the DOJ nonpoliti-
266 267
cal, and the removal of USA David Marston. Senator Sam Ervin, whose
concern arose out of his chairmanship of the Senate's Watergate investiga-
tion, held hearings on a bill that would have established the DOJ as an
independent agency outside of executive branch control.268 Ervin's bill estab-
lished a term of six years for the AG, who would be appointed by the
president with Senate advice and consent and would not be removable by
the president except for "neglect of duty or malfeasance. 269 USAs were re-
movable at will by the AG, 70 but because the president could not remove theAG, USAs were effectively beyond executive control.
262. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90.
263. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59
(1983); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926); Magill, supra note 143, at 52.
264. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686; Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958);
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-630 (1935); Magill, supra note 143, at
52.
265. See discussion infra Section IUC.
266. See House Marston Hearings, supra note 2, at 2.
267. See supra note 2.
268. See Removing Politics Hearings, supra note 195.
269. S. 2803, 93d Cong. § 2(a) (1973).
270. See id. § 4(a).
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Despite potential independence benefits of completely insulating the
DOJ from partisan pressures, such an arrangement almost certainly violates
the Constitution. Even amid the deep concern surrounding Watergate,
commentators doubted that Ervin's proposal was constitutional." ' If
Congress made such a proposal today, the result would likely be the same.
Momentarily putting aside the question of whether the framers viewed
prosecution as a function outside the purview of the executive branch, 271 if
under a formalistic analysis a reviewing court found the DOJ to be an
executive department, Congress's attempt to remove the DOJ from executive
control would be unconstitutional.2 " From a functional analysis, creating an
entirely independent DOJ would inhibit the president's ability to meet his duty
under the Take Care Clause because he would lose all control over policy
implementation.274 Finally, while there may be benefits arising from impartial
enforcement of the laws, such an extreme degree of independence could
actually hinder accountability because a completely independent DOI would
likely have no political master.275
2. The Civil Service Due Process Amendments Model
A potential avenue for creating a "good cause" standard could involve the
expansion of the coverage of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("the
Board"). The majority of federal employees' employment relationships with
the government are controlled by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
("CSRA"). 276 The CSRA created the Board to review claims of impropriety
277brought by federal employees covered under the Act. However, the CSRA
originally applied only to those employees, in the competitive service, exclud-
ing excepted service employees, such as Assistant USAs ("AUSAs"), and
presidential appointees, such as USAs. 27' Following the scandal-tainted re-
moval of an award-winning, excepted service Navy attorney in 1984,
Congress investigated whether excepted service employees should be brought
271. See, e.g., Removing Politics Hearings, supra note 195, at 427-33 (statement of Robert L.
Tienken, Senior Specialist in American Public Law, Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service).
272. See supra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
273. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1987); id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One
of the few points on which the majority and Justice Scalia did agree was that prosecution is tradi-
tionally considered to be a function of the Executive Branch.
274. See Removing Politics Hearings, supra note 195 (statement of Robert L. Tienken); Peter
L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 648 (1984) (claiming that one of the president's core functions is having "sig-
nificant, ongoing relationships with all agencies responsible for law-administration").
275. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson, supra note
232) (describing the power of unchecked prosecution).
276. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); see supra note 200.
277. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1205-1208 (2006).
278. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(F)-(G) (2006); see supra note 200.
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under the CSRA and be given an opportunity to challenge a dismissal before
the Board. 2 9 In 1990 Congress passed the Civil Service Due Process Amend-
ments, with the purpose of granting appeal rights in adverse personnel actions
to most members of the excepted service. The amendments brought AUSAs
within the due process protections of CSRA. s' However, USAs are still ex-
cluded from the CSRA and cannot bring an action to the Board challenging a
removal.282 Thus, a second method to provide USAs with an ability to chal-
lenge an improper removal, such as the partisan removal in the case of the
283fired USAs, would be to bring them within the CSRA.
This method of removal limitation offers the benefits of independence in
prosecutorial discretion and executive accountability for decision making.
Allowing an individual USA a forum in which to bring a claim that an of-
fered explanation for her removal was pretext for a partisan removal could
increase the visibility and transparency necessary for a robust political
check. While the fired USAs, together, created sufficient publicity to acti-
vate the political check, the removal of Bud Cummins and Todd Graves
demonstrates that a small number of USAs fired for partisan reasons may be
284
unable to attract media attention. If a USA possesses the ability to chal-
lenge her dismissal it may increase public focus, thereby strengthening the
political check.
The problem with Congress subjecting the USAs to a good cause stan-
dard is that such a limit approaches the constitutional gray area because it is
unclear if it adequately respects the president's Article II grant to execute
policy if a USA simply disagrees with DOJ priorities, a necessary condition
to pass constitutional muster. The fact that a good cause limit on a prosecu-
tor did pass muster in Morrison is grounds to believe that such a provision
would be valid for USAs as well. 28' However, because the office of a USA
does not primarily investigate high-level executive officials, it may have less
need for independence, and removal limitations may be more likely to tram-
mel on the president's Article II authority.
279. See Jay Mathews, Lawyer's Firing Prompts Hill Inquiry, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1984, at
A5. The firing of Navy Ocean Systems Center general counsel, Stephen Stowitz, spurred Congress's
legislation in the excepted service, due process area. Jay Mathews, Attorney's Legal Battle With
Navy Gets a Twist, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1987, at A26.
280. Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (1990)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (2006)).
281. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(c). Compare McGregor v. Greer, 748 F. Supp. 881, 884
(D.D.C. 1990) (finding an AUSA without a due process cause of action to challenge her removal
prior to the Civil Service Due Process Amendments), with Van Wersch v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 197 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the Civil Service Due Process Amend-
ments were intended to give excepted-service employees a basis to challenge adverse employment
actions).
282. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (b)(1)-(3) (2006).
283. See discussion infra Section Im.B.
284. See discussion supra Part I.
285. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (stating that despite the fact that the IC
was an executive officer, "we cannot say that the imposition of a 'good cause' standard for removal
by itself unduly trammels on executive authority").
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3. The Independent Counsel Model
A third possible solution is for Congress to pass a statute restricting the
removal of USAs modeled after the statute at issue in Morrison-the Ethics
in Government Act-that provides the USAs with "good cause" protection,
enables a removed USA to challenge her removal in federal court, and in-
cludes a reporting requirement.286 The Act vested appointment of the IC, an
inferior officer,28' in a special court (the Special Division) set up by the Act,
but the Special Division only gained appointment authority if the AG found
reasonable grounds for an investigation. 2" The AG also possessed the au-
thority to terminate the office of the IC; however, the AG's-and by
extension the president's-removal authority was limited to "good cause.2 89
The Act required that if the AG removed the IC, the AG had to report to
Congress the facts and grounds underlying the removal.' 90 Congress could
thus amend the statute governing USA removal,29' replacing it with the
cause and reporting language that the Court allowed in Morrison.
Like the Due Process Amendments model, the IC model provides execu-
tive accountability and prosecutorial independence benefits, but it
unconstitutionally infringes on the president's removal power. The IC model
may be preferable to the Due Process Amendments model because of the
additional requirement that the executive would have to provide reasons for
292a USA's removal. Reporting to Congress strengthens the constitutional
value of accountability. The downside of a USA removal statute modeled
after the IC Act is that in the USA context it is not clear that removal only
for good cause allows the president to ensure the faithful execution of the
293laws if he has a policy disagreement with a USA.
286. The Act was first enacted in 1978. Id. at 660 n.l (citing Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867).
The amended version of the Act at issue in Morrison and discussed here is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 591-599 (2000). See § 596(a)(3) for an IC's ability to challenge her removal in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.
287. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
288. See 28 U.S.C. § 592 (2000).
289. The Act provided:
An independent counsel appointed under this chapter may be removed from office, other than
by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only
for good cause, physical or mental disability (if not prohibited by law protecting persons from
discrimination on the basis of such a disability), or any other condition that substantially im-
pairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties.
28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2000).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2) (2000).
291. "Each United States attorney is subject to removal by the President." 28 U.S.C. § 541(c)
(2000).
292. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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4. A Hybrid Approach: The Accountability Model
Rather than rely on a model that so closely approaches a constitutional
gray area, Congress should adopt legislation that focuses on the constitu-
tional values of balance and accountability. The normative justification for
Justice Scalia's version of the removal power is that the president must be
able to control executive officers, and worries about such a sweeping ver-
sion of the removal power are assuaged by the political check, which serves
to stop the president from exercising the removal power in an improper way
that the public would find offensive. 94 This vision is premised on valuing a
unitary executive and accountability. New legislation should thus ensure that
presidential accountability is robust without undermining the president's
"executive power" or his mandate to ensure that the laws are "faithfully exe-
cuted." Legislation containing an informational component and a cause of
action component could improve accountability without undermining the
president's Article II authority.295 Further, the constitutional value of balance
291is a central separation of powers concern. While some commentators have
criticized Morrison for using a functionalist approach that relies on an "ad
hoc" sense of separation of powers,' 97 others have praised its approach as
best serving the constitutional value of balance, particularly given the rise of
298the executive since the founding. Legislation should thus endeavor to bal-
ance these goals of accountability and unitariness.
The first component of legislation under what this Note terms the
Accountability Model is a reporting requirement borrowed from the
IC Model. The Ethics in Government Act included a reporting requirement
that provided the following:
If an independent counsel is removed from office, the Attorney General
shall promptly submit to the division of the court and the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report
specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such removal. The
committees shall make available to the public such report, except that each
committee may, if necessary to protect the rights of any individual named
in the report or to prevent undue interference with any pending prosecu-
tion, postpone or refrain from publishing any or all of the report.2
99
294. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
295. See id. at 691 (majority opinion).
296. See Flaherty, supra note 112, at 1821, 1828-32.
297. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Abner S. Greene, Checks and
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 175 (1994); Lee S. Liber-
man, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
313, 345-46 (1989).
298. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 112, at 1835-36; Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
488, 523-24 (1987) (discussing accountability and balance in a pre-Morrison discussion of Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)).
299. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2) (2000).
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A similar requirement should be included in the Accountability Model. The
same rationale for reporting in the IC model proves beneficial in the USA
context. The evidence in the recent USA removals shows that the admini-
stration effected partisan removals and supplied a performance-based
justification.3 0 The purpose of this pretextual justification was to subvert the
political check and insulate the president from any accountability if the re-
movals were unpopular.'
The second component of legislation could be drafted in one of two
ways. One option is for the provision to specifically provide that "partisan"
removals are prohibited and create a cause of action for a USA to challenge
a "partisan" removal in federal court. A second option is for such a provi-
sion to create an unspecified cause of action for claims arising under the
Constitution and allow the USA challenging the removal to argue that the
removal power does not encompass removals that are not necessary to the
• 302
Take Care Clause or the Vesting Clause. In the case of the first option, a
challenge to such a provision would likely claim that the removal limitation
is unconstitutional, and the USA would be forced to defend the provision
under the Morrison Court's reasoning,3 3 as well as the accountability, bal-
ance, and pretext arguments described in Section II.A.3°4 In the case of the
latter option, the USA would make the constitutional argument directly and
claim that the dismissal was an unconstitutional overreach of the removal305
power. In either case the issue would be decided in court and the USA
would possess the means to claim that her removal was an unconstitutional
executive overreach and-at the very least-further the operation of the po-
litical check by bringing attention to the potentially wrongful dismissal.
Because limitations on executive removal can comport with constitutional
values of balance and accountability,3°6 either type of cause of action-
whether for prohibited partisan removals or for claims arising under the
Constitution-could further separation of powers goals. A cause of action
component of new legislation would enhance the constitutional value of ac-
countability. Informational removal requirements are diminished if there is no
formal method to challenge a removal that a USA feels is prohibited by the
Constitution or the proposed statute. In addition, if there is no way for a USA
to challenge a removal, there can be no balance between constitutionally
proper congressional limits and executive branch assertion of the removal
power because there can be no enforcement. In the past Congress has consid-
300. See discussion supra Part 1.
301. See discussion supra Part 1.
302. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1958); supra notes 145-159, 249-
256 and accompanying text; infra notes 310-318 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
304. See discussion supra Section I.A; infra notes 311,317 and accompanying text.
305. See discussion supra Section i.A; infra notes 311, 317 and accompanying text.
306. Flaherty, supra note 112, at 1835-36.
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ered giving a USA access to a federal court to challenge her removal; 0 7 this-
in combination with the first component of the Accountability Model-would
further separation of powers principles. Such a provision will, however, trans-
fer the inquiry into pretextual removals to the judiciary.
C. McDonnell Douglas: Parsing "Partisan" and "Political"
Whether a dismissed USA argues under a statute prohibiting "partisan"
removals, or under a statute that merely provides a cause of action for
claims arising under the Constitution, the USA would make similar argu-
ments regarding accountability and a need for independence in the office of
USA. Following the Morrison Court's logic, a USA making such a claim
would have to concede that Congress is unable to limit a removal that a
president makes for policy reasons-or political reasons where "politics" is
a proxy for policy-because such a limitation would interfere with the Take
Care Clause by hindering the president's ability to ensure legitimate policy
execution.0 8 A USA could, however, claim that a purely partisan removal
that is justified with pretext is unconstitutional-or barred by the proposed
statute-because purely partisan activities that are designed to benefit a po-
litical party or specific candidates do not relate to the president's Article II
powers.30 Such a claim raises two issues: first, whether a distinction be-
tween a "partisan" removal and a "political" removal is tenable; and second,
whether courts are equipped to entertain a factual dispute to determine the
true reasons behind a USA's removal.
1. "Policy," "Politics, " and "Partisan"
Shortly after he resigned as Gonzales's chief of staff, Kyle Sampson sug-
gested that any attempt to unpack a distinction between a partisan removal
and a performance-related removal must fail because of the nature of the job
of a USA.3 1 Commentators have, however, recognized a distinction between
"partisan" and "political.'"3' Sampson's interpretation conflates, or at least
fails to distinguish, the two terms. For example, many of the commentators
307. Merit Selection for United States Attorneys Act of 1978, H.R. 10514, 95th Cong. § 2
(1978).
308. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("[Tihe real question is whether the
removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his con-
stitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light.").
309. This argument could be particularly compelling when a court considers a desire for some
prosecutorial independence in this calculus. See id. at 689-92 (noting that a good-cause removal
limitation in the case of the IC, for which some independence from the president was desired, can-
not be deemed to "unduly trammel[] on executive authority").
310. Prosecutorial Independence: Is The Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and
Firing of U.S. Attorneys?-Part III: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l10th Cong.
(Mar. 29, 2007) (testimony of D. Kyle Sampson, former Chief of Staff to the Att'y Gen.).
311. The Bush v. Gore analogy is drawn from Professor Michael Dorf's blog. See Posting of
Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law (Mar. 19. 2007, 08:19 EST), supra note 223; Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837, 858-70.
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who responded critically to Bush v. Gore sought to explain their disapproval
of that decision by differentiating "political" concerns as relating to policy
and ideology from "partisan" concerns as relating to political parties and
elections."' The criticisms generally took no issue with a judge deciding
policy issues that aligned with her political views, "politics" serving as a
proxy for "policy."' They instead questioned the legitimacy of a court when a
judge rules based on which political party will win-a decision on "partisan"
grounds.3t4 Two commentators have differentiated the "'high' politics [of]
larger political principles and ideological goals" from the "'low' politics of
partisan political advantage."3 At least one author has noted that determining
whether a Justice in Bush was acting in a jurisprudential or in a partisan fash-
ion requires an inquiry into whether the proffered doctrinal reasons for the
decision were pretext-a requirement similar to the need to look into pretext
in assessing whether a removal decision was political or partisan.
3 6
One of the difficulties in forcing a court to distinguish partisanship from
policy-or worse, partisanship from politics as a proxy for policy-is the
necessarily fact-intensive inquiry that is required. Commentators have filled
entire volumes debating whether Bush was an improper, partisan decision or
an exercise of impartial jurisprudence in a difficult case.3 7 As the recent
USA removals demonstrate, without intensive factfinding, executive branch
officials may offer pretextual, ex post justifications for a firing motivated by
partisanship.3 Whether a court is equipped to undertake a pretext analysis is
thus a critical question.
312. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Many commentators have discussed the issue of partisanship, dis-
tinct from something like politics as a proxy for policy. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the
Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408-09 (2001); Jesse H. Choper, Why
the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18 CONST. COM-
MENT. 335, 347 (2001) ("[lit is critical to distinguish between judicial (or jurisprudential) ideology
and political ideology (or crude partisanship)."); Sanford Levinson, Return of Legal Realism, THE
NATION, Jan. 8, 2001, at 8; see Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in BUSH v. GORE 192, 197-98 (Bruce
Ackerman ed., 2002); see generally Guido Calabresi, In Partial (but not Partisan) Praise of Princi-
ple, in BUSH v. GORE, supra, at 67, 71-77; ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE
HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 4-10, 116-17, 194 (2001); cf CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDREAL JUDICIARY 129-56 (2006)
(discussing judges' political parties and judicial decision making, particularly on hot "political"
issues, but not deploying the same attacks of illegitimacy as the commentators critiquing Bush).
313. Balkin, supra note 312; Choper, supra note 312.
314. Balkin, supra note 312, at 1408-09; Choper, supra note 312, at 347-52.
315. See Balkin, supra note 312, at 1408-09 (citing Levinson, supra, note 312, at 8).
316. See Choper, supra note 312, at 348.
317. Compare DERSHOWITZ, supra note 312; Ackerman, supra note 312; and Balkin, supra
note 312, with RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONsTI-
TUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Nelson Lund, An Act of Courage, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 25,
2000, at 24, reprinted in FLORIDA 2000: A SOURCEBOOK ON THE CONTESTED PRESIDENTIAL ELEC-
TION 291 (Mark Whitman ed., 2003); and Laurens Walker, The Stay Seen Around the World: The
Order That Stopped the Vote Recounting In Bush v. Gore, 18 J.L. & POL. 823 (2002).
318. See discussion supra Part 1.
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2. McDonnell Douglas, Pretext Inquiries in Dismissal
Claims, and the Issue of Mixed Motives
Fortunately, a framework on which a reviewing court could rely to parse
a partisan firing from a firing motivated by politics as a proxy for policy
already exists. The seminal case is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, in
which the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty that a plaintiff faced in
proving employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.3 9 In response, the Court created what came to be known as the
McDonnell Douglas test, an evidentiary, burden-shifting test to enable plain-
tiffs to demonstrate prohibited intent in employment discrimination cases.32
Under the test and its Supreme Court progeny, the plaintiff makes a prima
311facie case by demonstrating that she was fired for a prohibited reason. In
the case of a former USA bringing a claim under the proposed cause of ac-
tion,322 she could claim that she was fired for purely partisan reasons and
that the true reasons for dismissal exceeded the scope of the removal power
or are prohibited by the proposed statute. 23
If a court agreed with a USA that a partisan firing exceeded the removal
power or that a statute prohibiting partisan removals was constitutional, the
court would have to continue its inquiry and determine whether the executive
branch undertook the firing for purely partisan reasons. Under the McDonnell
Douglas test, once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employee's rejection. 324 If the employer is able to meet
its burden of showing a nondiscriminatory justification for the firing, the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, must "be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason for [the plaintiff's]
rejection was in fact pretext.' 325 In the case of a USA bringing a claim of parti-
san firing, this component of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry would unfurl
much like the back-and-forth that occurred between the fired USAs and the
DOJ.
326
Through this process, a single USA fired for partisan reasons could gain
the benefits that the entire group of fired USAs eventually shared. In private
319. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
320. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 181-92 (2d ed. 2004).
321. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff's
showing of pretext through the most indirect means allowed by McDonnell Douglas, simply con-
vincing the trier of fact, permits but does not require judgment for the plaintiff); Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (holding that the employer's rebuttal burden could only be
discharged through evidence clearly demonstrating the proffered reason for discharge).
322. See discussion supra Section IlI.B.4.
323. See discussion supra Section lI.A; supra note 308 and accompanying text.
324. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
325. Id. at 804.
326. See discussion supra Part I.
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employment, by shifting the burden to the employer after the plaintiff makes
a prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas test encourages the production
of evidence, which is critical to an analysis of the firing but may be difficult
to obtain otherwise." 7 Even in the present case, where Congress held hear-
ings on the firings, it complained that the administration was not
forthcoming with evidence.328 If a court employed a burden-shifting frame-
work, it would likely increase the amount of information available regarding
the removal.
This Note is not the first authority to suggest increased utilization of the
McDonnell Douglas framework in adjudicating factual issues relating to
329partisanship against the backdrop of a constitutional claim. In Vieth v.
Jubelirer the Supreme Court heard claims from Democratic Pennsylvania
voters that the Pennsylvania redistricting following the 2000 census was an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.33 ° In a plurality decision, four
Justices found that claims of such gerrymandering were not justiciable; 3 1
the four dissenters believed that the claim was justiciable, but produced
three alternative methods for ascertaining unconstitutional partisan
332gerrymandering. Justices Souter and Ginsburg proposed to "start anew"
with an inquiry based on the McDonnell Douglas framework.
33
There are significant similarities between a partisan gerrymandering in-
quiry and a partisan removal claim. Like the USA removals, the difficulty in
recognizing improper gerrymandering arises because political considera-
tions are necessarily part of the process, but the "Court's job must be to
identify clues ... indicating that partisan competition has reached an ex-
tremity of unfairness. 334 After describing gerrymandering-specific claims
for plaintiffs to make a prima facie case,333 the Justices explained that the
burden would then be on the government to show legitimate reasons for its
actions "by reference to objectives other than naked partisan advantage. 336
While Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented from the plurality, and the
state of a gerrymandering test after Vieth is muddled at best, 3 7 it is clear that
327. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993).
328. See, e.g., Conyers Memo, supra note 21, at 19, 27, 30-31.
329. One commentator has noted the similarities of the USA firings to the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry and the potential utility of importing the burden-shifting framework to thinking
about the USA firings. Posting of Brad Wendel to Legal Ethics Forum, http://
legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2007/03/thinking-about_.html (Mar. 19, 2007, 13:46 EST).
330. 541 U.S. 267, 271-73 (2004).
331. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.
332. See id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 344.
335. Id. at 347-51.
336. Id. at 351.
337. E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEx. L. REv. 781, 782 (2005)(arguing that Vieth created significant uncertainty because the plurality insisted that partisan gerry-
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the McDonnell Douglas framework can be useful for resolving fact-
intensive disputes involving claims of partisanship such as the USA remov-
als.
A final complication to this analysis is the issue of dismissals that occur
for both allowed and prohibited reasons, referred to in employment law ju-
risprudence as "mixed motives" cases. Mixed-motives cases present a
problem for the McDonnell Douglas framework, which assumes that an em-
ployer's reason for a dismissal was grounded entirely in either an allowed or
prohibited reason, but not a combination of the two.338 In the USA context,
the issue of mixed motives would have to serve as an outer limit beyond
which Congress could not limit removal and a dismissed USA could not
state a cognizable constitutional claim. The difference between the employ-
ment law jurisprudence and the framework that this Note advocates arises
from the underlying authority. In the employment context, an employer has
the burden to show that the employment decision would have been the same
regardless of the prohibited motive because "[i]n passing Title VII, Congress
made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and
natural origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation
of employees. 339 In contrast, in the context of a USA firing, the claim need
not be that politics "must be irrelevant to employment decisions; 3 40 instead,
the claim should be that, for a removal to constitute a legitimate exercise of
the president's authority, it cannot be pure partisanship designed only to
effect electoral advantage.3 4' A claim based solely on allegations that parti-
san motives played only some role in a removal would thus fail. While this
limits the applicability of the framework that this Note suggests, it retains
the president's constitutionally required Article II grant.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Morrison leaves room for Congress to craft nar-
row removal power limitations for inferior officers that should pass
constitutional muster. The facts of the USA firings indicate that the USAs
were likely removed because they failed to follow not just political, but par-
tisan, goals that the White House sought to implement through the DOJ.
While any new legislation may be no help to the fired USAs, the unprece-
dented removal of nine USAs should spur Congress to prevent such an
mandering was not justiciable despite all of the Justices' agreement that excessively partisan gerry-
mandering is unconstitutional); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 601, 603-04 (2007) ("[Tjhe Court ... failed to resolve several ... important issues [related to
gerrymandering and] .... is utterly at sea with respect to its role in policing the manipulation of
democratic outcomes by political elites."); Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won't Make Law: Parti-
san Gerrymandering and a Structural Approach to the Lw of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097,
1097 (2007) ("After two prominent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on partisan gerrymandering dur-
ing recent years, the law of partisan gerrymandering remains as muddled as beforehand.").
338. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 320, at 215.
339. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
340. Id. at 240.
341. See discussion supra Section IfI.A.
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abuse in the future. Congress failed to act after the Marston Affair. If it had,
the recent scandal may have been avoided. Despite the availability of a
number of previously proposed legislative frameworks, none provides a sat-
isfactory balance between the president's constitutionally mandated control
of the executive branch and the separation of powers values of accountabil-
ity and balance. As such, Congress should adopt new legislation that
promotes transparency in personnel practice at the DOJ and permits a U.S.
Attorney who believes her removal is an unconstitutional overreach to chal-
lenge that removal in federal court.
